


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# **MADHVA'S AUPANIṢADAM DARŚANAM**



By :

**Dr. B.N.K. SHARMA**

Published by :

**Dvaita Vedanta Studies & Research Foundation  
Bangalore**

## THE AUTHOR

Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, Retired Professor of Sanskrit, Ruparel College, Bombay, has attained international renown and recognition by his scholarly contributions to the Dvaita Vedanta literary treasure. His 'History of Dvaita School Of Vedanta And Its Literature' is a monumental work which brought him the highest national literary distinction of the Sahitya Academy Award in 1964. His works, dealing with the Brahma Sutras and the different commentaries on it, have brought him to the foreground of the philosophical world more prominently. He has completed his epoch making work on Brihadaranyaka upanisad which should be a very great source of instruction for research scholars and laymen as well.




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


# MADHVA'S AUPANISADAM DARŚANAM



By :

Dr. B.N.K. SHARMA



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Dvaita Vedanta Studies  
& Research Foundation  
Bangalore

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# KEY TO DIACRITICAL MARKS

|              |            |     |             |
|--------------|------------|-----|-------------|
| अ            | <i>a</i>   | ठ   | <i>ṭha</i>  |
| आ            | <i>ā</i>   | ड   | <i>ḍa</i>   |
| इ            | <i>i</i>   | ढ   | <i>ḍha</i>  |
| ई            | <i>ī</i>   | ण   | <i>ṇa</i>   |
| उ            | <i>u</i>   | त   | <i>ta</i>   |
| ऊ            | <i>ū</i>   | थ   | <i>tha</i>  |
| क            | <i>k</i>   | द   | <i>da</i>   |
| क़           | <i>ḳ</i>  | ध   | <i>dha</i>  |
| ए            | <i>e</i>   | न   | <i>na</i>   |
| ऐ            | <i>ai</i>  | प   | <i>pa</i>   |
| ओ            | <i>o</i>   | फ   | <i>pha</i>  |
| औ            | <i>au</i>  | ब   | <i>ba</i>   |
| • (अनुस्वार) | <i>m̐</i>  | भ   | <i>bha</i>  |
| : (विसर्ग)   | <i>ḥ</i>   | म   | <i>ma</i>   |
| क            | <i>kā</i>  | य   | <i>ya</i>   |
| ख            | <i>kha</i> | र   | <i>ra</i>   |
| ग            | <i>ga</i>  | ल   | <i>la</i>   |
| घ            | <i>gha</i> | व   | <i>va</i>   |
| ङ            | <i>ṅa</i>  | श   | <i>śa</i>   |
| च            | <i>ca</i>  | ष   | <i>ṣa</i>   |
| छ            | <i>cha</i> | स   | <i>sa</i>   |
| • ज          | <i>ja</i>  | ह   | <i>ha</i>   |
| झ            | <i>jha</i> | ळ   | <i>ḷa</i>   |
| ञ            | <i>ña</i>  | क्ष | <i>ksha</i> |

## ABBREVIATIONS

|                    |                                             |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| <i>A. Ā</i>        | <i>Aitareya Āraṇyaka</i>                    |
| <i>AC</i>          | <i>Abhinavacandrikā (Satyanātha Tīrtha)</i> |
| <i>adhi.</i>       | <i>adhikaraṇa</i>                           |
| <i>Ait. Up.</i>    | <i>Aitareya Upaniṣad</i>                    |
| <i>AV</i>          | <i>Anuvyākhyāna (Madhva)</i>                |
| <i>B</i>           | <i>Brāhman</i>                              |
| <i>BD</i>          | <i>Bhāṣyadīpikā (Jagannātha Tīrtha)</i>     |
| <i>BG</i>          | <i>Bhagavad Gītā</i>                        |
| <i>B. S.</i>       | <i>Brahmasūtras</i>                         |
| <i>B. T.</i>       | <i>Bhāgavata-Tātparya (Madhva)</i>          |
| <i>Bhāg.</i>       | <i>Bhāgavata</i>                            |
| <i>Bṛh. Up.</i>    | <i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i>               |
| <i>BSB</i>         | <i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i>                    |
| <i>C</i>           | <i>Commentary</i>                           |
| <i>Chān. Up.</i>   | <i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i>                   |
| <i>GB</i>          | <i>Gītā Bhāṣya</i>                          |
| <i>G. K.</i>       | <i>Gauḍapāda Kārikās</i>                    |
| <i>G. T.</i>       | <i>Gītā Tātparyanirṇaya (Madhva)</i>        |
| <i>J.</i>          | <i>Jayatīrtha</i>                           |
| <i>Kauṣ. Up.</i>   | <i>Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad</i>                   |
| <i>M.</i>          | <i>Madhva</i>                               |
| <i>Mah. N. Up.</i> | <i>Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad</i>                |
| <i>Mah. op.</i>    | <i>Mahānirṇaya</i>                          |
| <i>Mbh.</i>        | <i>Mahābhārata</i>                          |



|                      |                                                    |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Mbh. T. N.</i>    | <i>Mahābhārata Tātparyanirṇaya (Madhva)</i>        |
| <i>Māṇḍ. Up.</i>     | <i>Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad</i>                           |
| <i>Muṇḍ. Up.</i>     | <i>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad</i>                            |
| <i>NS.</i>           | <i>Nyāya Sudhā (Jayatīrtha)</i>                    |
| <i>Ny. Muktāvali</i> | <i>Nyāya-Muktāvali (Rāghavendra)</i>               |
| <i>NV</i>            | <i>Nyāya-Vivaraṇa (Madha)</i>                      |
| <i>NVB</i>           | <i>Nyāyavivaraṇa-Bhāvyabodha (Raghūttama)</i>      |
| <i>NYM</i>           | <i>Nyāyāmṛta (Vyāsatīrtha)</i>                     |
| <i>Paṇ.</i>          | <i>Pāṇini (Sūtras)</i>                             |
| <i>Q.</i>            | <i>Quoted</i>                                      |
| <i>R.</i>            | <i>Rāmānuja</i>                                    |
| <i>Raghū. TPB</i>    | <i>Raghūttama's Tattvaparakāśikā-Bhāvyabodha</i>   |
| <i>Rāgh. TPB</i>     | <i>Rāghavendra's Tattvaparakāśikā-Bhāvadīpa</i>    |
| <i>RV</i>            | <i>Ṛg. Veda</i>                                    |
| <i>S</i>             | <i>Śaṅkara</i>                                     |
| <i>STC</i>           | <i>Śeṣa-Tātparya-Candrikā (Raghunātha Tīrtha)</i>  |
| <i>Śvet. Up.</i>     | <i>Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad</i>                       |
| <i>T. Ā.</i>         | <i>Taittirīya Āraṇyaka</i>                         |
| <i>Taitt. Up.</i>    | <i>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</i>                         |
| <i>TC</i>            | <i>Tātparya-Candrika (Vyāsatīrtha)</i>             |
| <i>TS</i>            | <i>Tattvasaṅkhyāna (Madhva)</i>                    |
| <i>TD</i>            | <i>Tattvapradīpa (Trivikrama Paṇḍita)</i>          |
| <i>TDP.</i>          | <i>Tantradīpika (Rāghavendra)</i>                  |
| <i>TP.</i>           | <i>Tattvaparakāśikā (Jayatīrtha)</i>               |
| <i>TPG</i>           | <i>Tattvaparakāśika-Gurvārthadīpika (Vādirāja)</i> |
| <i>Up.</i>           | <i>Upaniṣad</i>                                    |
| <i>VTN</i>           | <i>Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya (Madha)</i>                  |
| <i>VTNt.</i>         | <i>Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya-tika (Jayatīrtha)</i>        |





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
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‘Sri Sri Gopinatho Vijayate’

SRI SRIPADARAJA MUTT,  
Mulbagal- Kolar.

*Sri Sri Vijayanidhitirtha* – blessed as pontiff by the lotus hands of *Sri Sri Satyanidhitirtha*, worshipper of the divine lotus feet of Lord *Sri Sri Gopīnātha* in the capacity of occupying the throne of learning of *Sri Srīpādarāja*, bearer of numerous titles such as ‘Srimat Paramahansa *parivrājaka*’ and the firm supporter of *Srimad Vaiṣṇava Siddhānta* -- we pray for the blessings of *Srīman Nārāyaṇa*.

Our prayers for the blessings of *Srīman Nārāyaṇa* on behalf of our well-wisher *Koulagi Ramacārya*.

Till now, the sixth day of the waning moon period of the month of *Kārtika*, we are keeping fine with our routine of holy bath, repetition of the Holy Name, meditation and worship of Lord *Sri Sri Gopīnātha*, the same as *Hayavadana* and *Rāṅgaviṭhala*. we are sending this, our message, as desired by you.

It is praiseworthy that the Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation has, for the upliftment of deserving souls, chalked out a number of projects to publish the Philosophy of *Srimad Anandatirtha* purporting the ‘eternal truth’. We pray for the blessings of *Srīman Nārāyaṇa* to enable the Foundation to continue its projects with redoubled vigour.


Taking the name of *Srīman Nārāyaṇa*, we offer our prayers to Lord *Sri Sri Gopīnātha*, the same as *Sri Hayavadana* and *Sri Rāṅgaviṭhala*.

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Sd/ – Sri Vijayanidhigalu.









## SRI PEJAWAR MUTT, UDUPI.

It is a matter of joy for all seekers of knowledge that the Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation has sponsored a big project for the propogation of Madhva philosophy through research and publication of rare texts and translations. Such deals in promoting *Mādhva* Philosophy are quite rare. We heartily welcome this effort of the foundation in meeting this inadequacy. May this project prosper by the grace of Sri Hari and Sri Guru and with the co-operation of the government and the public. We hope that the project will be successful in reflecting in people's minds the message of Sri Madhvacharya's Tatva vāda.

(Sd) Sri Visvesa thirtha Sripadangalavaru.

Sri Pejawar Mutt, Udupi.





## PREFACE

Way back in March 1980, a group of persons interested in and enthusiastic about Dvaita Vedanta met under the chairmanship of Late Dr. C. N. R. Rao and decided that it was necessary to have an organisation to initiate, develop and produce literature on Dvaita Vedanta which can be understood and appreciated by laymen having no knowledge of Sanskrit and directed Sri Koulagi Ramachar to prepare an outline and full-fledged project taking the assistance of Late Dr. T. K. Lakshman and Sri P. N. Srinivas of Techno Consult Services.

Accordingly, a project report covering the various activities, capital requirements and cost estimate thereof, highlighting the necessity for such an organisation with objectives such as.

- a) collection and publication of works on Dvaita Vedanta,
- b) Initiating comparative studies and Research on philosophy-Eastern and Western and Dvaita Vedanta in particular,
- c) Training scholars for the purpose etc.,

among several others of like nature submitted by him was accepted by the committee.

H.H. Sri Sri Vijayanidhi Swamiji of Sri Sripadaraja Mutt, Mulbagal, was approached for assistance and he readily agreed to place 4-1/2 acres of land at Narasimha Teertha at the disposal of the foundation and consented to be its chief patron.

H.H. Sri Vishveshvara Tirtha Swamiji of Pejawar Mutt, who was approached, readily agreed to be the patron of the organisation.

The project was submitted to the Government of Karnataka seeking financial assistance. The Government communicated their approval to the project in toto, and granted Rs. 2.50 lakhs as Aid.

The Foundation commenced its activities with effect from 15th September 1983 and has organised about 30 lectures by eminent philosophers. The texts of their lectures will be published in the Foundation's 'Dvaita Darsana Granthamala' for the benefit of those interested in the subject.

Several important works such as Histories and expositions of the school of thought have been translated and are being published shortly.

The present volume is the first in the series. It is sincerely hoped that these publications would rouse considerable enthusiasm among laymen and scholars interested in philosophy and particularly in Dvaita Vedanta, not only in India but also all over the world.

Philonthropists and charitable Institutions have come forward to assist the Institution and it is hoped that they will continue to do so to enable the Institution to fulfil its objectives.



## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We are extremely happy to present '*Madhvāchārya's Aupaniṣadam Darśanam*' in this form to our readers. This is our first publication in English.

We are under a deep debt of gratitude to Dr. B.N.K. Sharma Rtd. Professor, Ruparel College Bombay, for having delivered the five lectures at our request and for having made the script readily available for publication; and also for the interest that he evinced in revising and rectifying the printed matter.

We are thankful to Sri V. Badarayana murthy, for having carefully gone through proof correction and for having provided the design for the cover page.

Similarly, we are thankful to Smt. Vimala Srinivasan for having provided the design '*Dvāsuparnā*' for our emblem.

Our thanks are also due to M/s Sudha Mudrana Mandiram for getting the lectures neatly into book form.

Koulagi Ramachar

Hon. Secretary



## INTRODUCTION

I am happy to see that the Dvaita Vedanta studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, is bringing out the five lectures on *Sri. Madhvācāryā's Aupaniṣadam Darśanam* which I had delivered under its auspices last year at the Gokhale Hall, Bangalore, before a select audience of intellectuals.

Builders of the Dvaita System of Vedanta in the past thought and wrote mostly in Sanskrit – the all India language of higher thought and cultural vehicle in ancient India. Owing to the vicissitudes of Indian history, in the middle ages, Sanskrit receded into the background from its place of honour and has in modern times given place to the international language – the English language.

While the system of *Śankara* and *Rāmānuja* in the field of Vedanta have forged ahead in respect of their publicity, the Dvaita system of Madhva is still lagging very much behind. There is a very great and pressing necessity therefore to publicize the classics of this robust system of vedanta and its insightful solutions of the great many problems of philosophy in general and Indian philosophy in particular, as widely as possible through the medium of the English language to meet the growing needs of our times. It is highly gratifying to note that in recent years many westerners have been taking a lively interest in Madhva's philosophy. It would thus be very useful and advantageous to establish contacts with them also in serving a common cause.

My Lectures cover important aspects of Madhva's philosophy in general and the teachings of the Upanishads, the Brahmasutras and the Gita in particular.

The establishment of the Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research foundation in Bangalore is well-timed. Its purely



academic outlook is best suited for shouldering the great responsibility of bringing about a renaissance and reawakening of this great system of vedanta and bringing about a wider recognition and appreciation of its intrinsic value and merits irrespective of the number of its denominational followers.

My Lectures are intended to pinpoint the fundamentally Aupaniṣadic character of Dvaita Darsana and its philosophical ideology of the one Svatantra Tattva as the highest subject-matter of all philosophical quest and its culmination. This one Svatantra Tattva has to be necessarily conceived as a 'Saviśeṣa-principle' endowed with an infinite number of philosophical attributes. The relation of this Supreme reality to the world of matter and souls has also in consequence to be accepted as a real one. The problem of the bondage of Souls in this life and their transmigration and final release from it has also to be viewed from a realistic perspective. The cosmological theories of the Vedas and the Upanishads thus fall into their places in this over-all pattern in terms of a "*Nimittakāraṇavāda*". The *Parīṇāma* and *Vivartavāda* theories of causation call for examination in this set-up. The different interpretations of the Upanishadic texts bearing on this question such as *Yathaikena mṛtpiṇḍena Vijñātena Sarvam Mṛṇmayam Vijñātam Syāt* and the *Vācārambhaṇa - sṛti* have been considered in this connection.

The Lectures are designed to bring out how naturally and consistently Dvaita thought and its interpretation of the three prasthanas fit in with their spirit and letter and faithfully reflect them.

I now leave the reader to enjoy what follows.

4/2 Shah Building,

B.N.K. SHARMA

Bhagat Road,

Bombay 400016.

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## LECTURE I

### MADHVĀCĀRYĀ'S AUPANIṢADAM DARŚANAM.

*Its Logic And Metaphysics.*

— Dr. B.N.K. Sharma

Indian philosophy reached its culmination in the *Vēdānta* and its fulfilment in *Madhvā's Dvaita Darśana*:

पूर्वः पूर्वः पूर्वपक्षो यावन्मध्वमतोदयः ।

अन्ते सिद्धस्तु सिद्धान्तो मध्वस्यागम एव हि ॥

*Pūrvah Pūrvah Pūrvapakshō yāvanmadhvamatōdayah  
Antē Siddhastu Siddhāntō Madhvasyāgama ēva hi.*

This statement of *Vādiraja* is not to be understood as being oblivious of the existence of Post *Mādhva* commentaries on the B.S. such as those of *Nimbārka*, *Vallabha*, *Srikanṭha*. What is meant is, that their view-points are either subsumable in one or the other of the earlier systems or covered by their criticism in the standard works of the *Dvaita School*.

The *Dvaitavādās* Known to S. were chiefly those of the *Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya*, *Sēśvara Sāṅkhya* (Yoga) and *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* types. The *Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya* was frankly atheistic while the place given to *Īśvara* in the *Sēśvara*



*Sāṅkhya* was that of an auxiliary or common cause in cosmic developments. <sup>1</sup> In all these systems matter and souls, time, space or atoms were all independent principles. None of these systems have striven to establish God, *Isvara* or *Brahmah* as the only independent Reality in the sense of its being *ēkaṁ ēva advitīyaṁ*.

In this statement '*ēka*' affirms that it is the chief or independent Reality. *Ēva* rules out all internal differences within its bosom, as between itself and its attributes of consciousness, bliss, power, activity and manifestations.

पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।

*Pūrṇamadaḥ Pūrṇamidaṁ Pūrṇāt Pūrṇamudacyatē*

*Parāsyā Śaktirvividhaivā Śrūyatē Swābhāviki*

*jñānabalakriyā ca*

*Advaityam* rules out the possibility of any second independent principle, equal or superior to it (*Samādhikarahitaṁ*) <sup>2</sup> Prof. V. B. Inambdar (Homage to Dr. T. G. Manikar by C. R. Deshapande, Bombay 1982) has objected to this interpretation on the ground that it is

1) ईश्वरस्तु परजन्यवत् द्रष्टव्यः ।

*Īśvarastu parjanyaavat draṣṭavyaḥ.*



unknown to any commentator before Madhva. This is quite wrong as even two and a half centuries earlier than Madhva, *Yāmunācharya*, in his *Siddhitraya* has propounded the same interpretation of the word, while discussing the *Śrīti*. The other well known description of *B* as *Nityō Nityānāṁ* <sup>2</sup> in the *upaniṣads* spells out thier ideology of true *vēdāntic Dvaita darśana*, which came to be systematised by *Madhvācārya* in the 13th century.

While accepting the eternality of more than one *Tattva* or *Pramēya*, *Mādhva* philosophy holds only one of them, viz., God or *B* to be the one and only Independent Being and all the rest as dependent upon it. The concepts of independence and dependence have been defined in the philosophical system as :

स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविध्ये परानपेक्षं स्वतन्त्रम् ।

तदपेक्षमस्वतन्त्रम् ।

*Swarūpapramitipravṛttīlakṣhaṇa sattātraividhyē  
parānapekṣhaṁ swatantraṁ ; tadapēkshamaswatantraṁ.*

The *Swatantra* is that principle which does not depend on any other principle for its essential nature, and its power of knowing or becoming known or the power to act. This answers closely to Spinoza's definition of 'Substance' as *res complete*, complete in itself, capable of existing by itself and being explained entirely by itself.

## 2) नित्यो नित्यानाम् ।

The *Paratantra* is dependent on another for these. The question of how one or more eternal entities or beings can even be conceived to be dependent on another such being is answered by pointing out that it would be limiting the power of God or *Brahman* to hold that it can exercise control only over entities or beings which are not eternal or uncreated and cannot have such control over other eternal principles or beings. By its own intrinsic position and metaphysical status of being *Svatantra*, it is not impossible for *Brahman* to control other eternal principles and beings as well, besides the non-eternals. How else should we understand the *upaniṣadic* statement- '*Ya Ātmani tiṣṭhan atmānam antarō yamayati*', when the *Ātma* is admittedly eternal? The existence of many other eternal principles in the Universe such as time and space is also established by reasons and revelation. We have therefore to accept it and reconcile it with the concept of one *Svatantra Brahman*. It is not difficult to do so, as some try to make out. That there exist at least two eternal principles besides God, which are subject to Him is clearly stated in the *Śvētāśvatara upaniṣad*.

ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावनीशौ । क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।

*Jñājñāu dwāvanīśau. Ksharātmanāviśatē Dēva Ēkaḥ.*

The Vishnu purana includes *Kāla* among the eternal principles.

प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्चैव नित्यो कालश्च सत्तम ।

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*Prakṛtiḥ puruṣaścaiva nityo kālāśca sattama.*



The Bhagavata Text :-

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतस्सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ।

*Dravyam karma ca kālāśca swabhāvo jīva ēva ca  
yadanugrahataḥ saṁti na saṁti yadupēkshayā.*

which is often quoted by *Madhva*, speaks clearly of the eternal dependence of eternal varieties like *Jīva*, beginningless fitness of *Jīvās*, *Kāla* and *Swabhāva* of the eternal principles, on the Eternal God. The reason for recognising certain principles besides God as eternal and uncreated in time has been adequately explained in *Madva's* philosophy. Take the *Jīvas* whose continued existence in all the three periods of time has been taught by the *Gītācārya* at the very beginning of his discourse to *Arjuna*—

न त्वेवाहं जातु नासं न त्वं नेमे जनाधिपाः ।

न चैव न भविष्यामः सर्वे वयमतःपरम् ।

*Na tvēvāhaṁ jātu nāsaṁ na twaṁ nēmē janādhipāḥ*

*Na caiva na bhaviṣyāmaḥ sarvē vayamataḥparam.*

The counter hypothesis of the creation of *Jīva* in time would at once expose him to impermanence and the lord to *Vaiṣamya* and *Nairgrhya* in ordering their lives in different ways and putting them in different places, high and low, into different opportunities and limitations. The creation of space is inconceivable. 'If space is created, it must have been previously non-existent. The non-existence of space



cannot however be imagined by any mental effort. If the non-existence of space is absolutely inconceivable, then necessarily its creation is absolutely inconceivable. (Spencer First principles. P. 27 ). The *Gita* puts down *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* as uncreated (*anādi*). The eternal existence of *Jīvās*, *Prakṛti*, time and space does not however confer on them any immunity from being dependent on *Brahman* metaphysically for further continued *Satta*, *Pravṛtti* and *Pramiti*.

Reality presents to the enquiring mind three primary data - the thinking Selves, a world of external reality and indications or intimations of an infinite power rising above the self and the not-self. An unbalanced exaltation of any one of these three data over the rest is the source of much false philosophy and bad morals. The more pretentious philosophies of ancient and modern times which have sought to resolve these three data to one, have failed miserably in the end and ended up in Materialism, Pantheism or solepsism or have been forced to make compromises or concede some sort of conditional or phenomenal reality or the other through the back door. The function of philosophy aided by reason and experience is to determine by what relationship of the three data of experience man's spiritual progress and needs can be really and fully satisfied.

The three data have been designated in *Vēdānta* philosophy as *Bhokta*, *Bhoga* and *prema*, or *Jiva*, *Jada*,

and *Īśvara*, or *Jña*, *Ajña* and *Dēva* as the *Svetasvatara Upanishad*, has it, depriving them of their realism. *Madhvā's* philosophy brings them in an ontological classification of two irreducible grades of reality—*Svatantra* and *Paratantra*.

स्वतन्त्रं परतन्त्रं च प्रमेयं द्विविधं मतम् ।

*Swatantraṁ Paratantraṁ ca pramēyaṁ dvividhaṁ Mataṁ*

This is the true significance of the designation of *Dvaita* given to *Madhva's* thought. This difference itself and others of its kind are but an expression of the dependence of the *Paratantra* on the *Svatantra*.

In broad outlines this difference embraces the differences that exist between the *Jivās* and the *Jadatattvās* from each other and their difference from *Brahman* as well as the difference that exists among the *Jaḍa tattvās* themselves and among the *Jivās* themselves. We have thus a fivefold scheme of differences.

पञ्चविधो भेदः

*Pañcavidhō bhēdaḥ*

As it is the expression of the dependence of all finite reality and their differences on the *Svatantra tattva*, its realisation is the means of attaining *Moksha*. Knowledge of *Pañcabhēda* is thus indispensable for *Moksha*. Hence it is designated as *Pra-pañca* The (Lofty Five):<sup>1</sup>

1) पञ्चानां वर्गः पञ्चः । 'पञ्चदशतौ वर्गे वा' इति

वा शब्देन पञ्चशब्दस्यापि निपाताङ्गीकारात् (NS)

*Pañcānaṁ vargaḥ panchaḥ panchaddaśatau vargē vā iti*

*Vāśabdēna pancha śabdaṣyāpi nipāthāṅgikārāt.*

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प्रकृष्टः पञ्चविधो भेदः प्रपञ्चः

प्रकृष्टता च मोक्षाङ्गज्ञानतया ( J. VTN. T )

*Prakṛṣṭaḥ pañcavidhō bhēdaḥ. prapañcaḥ*

*Prakṛṣṭatā ca Mōkshāṅgañjanatayā (J. VTN. T)*

This etymological explanation of *Pra-pāñca* as conceived by Madhva has been given by his commentator *Jayatirtha*. He has also explained how this five-fold difference and its role as the chief means of realisation of *Brahman* are implicit in the teaching of the well known verse from the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*.

अनादिमाययासुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं अद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा

*Anādi māyayā suptō yadā Jivāḥ prabudhyatē*

*Ajamanidraṁ swapnaṁ advaitaṁ budhyatē tadā*

Here *anādimāyā* refers to both *Jada prakṛti* and its *guṇās* as well as the inscrutable power (*acintyādbhutaśakti*) of *Brahman* or its *Tirodhāyakaśakti*. The term *Jiva* in the singular is to be collectively understood. The difference between *Jada Māyā* and *Īśvarēccha* is obvious. So also the dependence of the *Jivas* who have been referred to as being subject to the obscuring power of *Māyā* from time immemorial and awakening — or being awakened by the grace of *Brahman* to behold the majesty of the sleepless and matchless supreme being :

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं बुध्यते तदा ।



We have thus in this famous *Upaniṣadic* Verse the concept of *Pañcabhēda* and its significance, brought out in full in a nutshell. *Rāmānuja* in his *Sribhāṣya* has caught but a glimpse of the deep Theistic significance of this *mantra*. It was left to Madhva to draw out and spell out the full significance of the statements and the clear support they gave to Theism.

Calm reflection will thus show that Madhva's classification of reality into two grades of *Svatantra* and *Paratantra* is philosophically both purposive and meaningful. Philosophy is interested in a quest not merely of the number of reals but their status. Dvaita philosophy endeavours to find out and determine, not only the status of the reals knowable by reason, experience and revelations. The clarification or determination of this status in terms of *Satya* and *Mithya* does not satisfy Madhva on grounds of experience, reason and revelation. While it is true enough that philosophy must distinguish between appearance and reality, it is equally, nay, still more necessary for it to realise the distinction between what is *Svatantra* and what is *Paratantra* in reality. The description of *Brahma*, in the *Upaniṣad* as *Satyasya satyam* indicates, according to Madhva that the saving truth is to be realised in terms of one Independent real which sustains all other reals. This is well brought out by Madhva's commentator who says: It is only when the dependent realities are realised to be vitally dependent on the

*Svatantra* that their knowledge contributes to the highest good. Otherwise the enumeration of Tattvas in philosophical analysis will be a waste of time and energy like the counting of the sands on the banks of the *Gaṅgā*.

These are words of profound wisdom for philosophers to ponder. It is this fact of the dependence of all finite reality on one *Svatantra* that has been and will be expressed for all time in the history of the cosmos through *sr̥ṣṭi*, *sthiti*, *samhāra*, *niyamana*, *jñāna* *ajñāna*, *bandha* and *Moksha*.

*Śaṅkara* holds that the reality of cosmos in terms of its location, sustenance etc., by Brahman is outside the purport of the *Śr̥tis*, as it does not contribute to our *Puruṣārtha* (B.S.B. 1. 4. 14). From what has been said already, it will be clear that the teaching about the reality of the world of matter and souls and its dependence on the one Supreme and Independent Brahman for every one of its eightfold determinations, serves the deepest purpose of enabling us to understand vividly the Majesty of the Supreme, whose realisation is the highest *Puruṣārtha* :

“तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति”

“बहुचिप्रजगद्बहुधाकरणात्परशक्तिरनन्तगुणः परमः”

*Tamēvaṁ vidwān amṛta iha bhavati.*

*Bahucitra Jagadbahudhākaraṇāt Paraśaktiranantaguṇaḥ*



Madhva's philosophy is in full agreement with the position of other Dvaitavadins that the state of bondage and release of Souls are both real states of experience for the *Ātman* (*bandhamokshasamānādhikarāṇya*). This is not acceptable to *Śaṅkara*. As a Theist, Madhva opposes all attempts at dismissing the *Paratāntra* as unreal (*mithya*). The three Tattvas of *Rāmānuja* (*Īśvara*, *Cit* and *acit*) can, without serious loss to philosophical thinking, be refitted into the two grades of *Svātāntra* and *Paratāntra*. Madhva also feels that it will be repugnant to the spirit of Theism to allow any *Paratāntra* real to attain equality of measure with the *Svātāntra* at any time, in any respect, as *Ramanuja's* acceptance of *Paramasāmya* between the released souls and God. Moreover, so long as there is the *Śeṣaśeṣibhāva* relation between Brahman and the released souls, according to *Rāmānuja* the expression of these respective attributes of *Jñāna ānanda* and *śakti* must necessarily be unequal. The *Svātāntrya* of Brahman carries with it its incomparableness with any other being which must necessarily be *Paratāntra*. To try to modify this in any instance will be to tamper with God's *svātāntrya* and compromise it, which cannot be permitted in a true Theism. All cogitations and conclusions of any philosophy must take note of this and trim its sails accordingly.

न युक्तमीशितुः किञ्चिदीशत्वस्य विरोधि यत् ।

यदीशत्वविरोधि स्यात् तदेवायुक्तम् ।

ईशत्वाविरोधेन योजयित्वा खिलाः प्रमाः ।



*Na yuktamiśiṭuḥ Kiñcit Īśatwasya Virodhi Yat.*

*Yadiśatwa virodhi syāt tadēva ayuktam.*

*Īśatwa avirōdhēna yojayitwākhilāḥ pramāḥ.*

*Śaṅkara* starts his philosophy with the uncriticisable certainty of the principle of consciousness of Self as the greatest common measure and residuum of the *avasthātraya* of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. He confirms this consciousness alone as the underlying reality, the states themselves together with their divergent experiences being dismissed as superimpositions on bare consciousness.

Curiously enough *Madhva* too starts from the same point of *Ātmic* consciousness which in its epistemological setting, functions as the *Sākshi* or self validating principle of *anubhava* and its certainty. This *Sākshi* is competent enough to test and adjudge the data of our experience, gathered from sense-perception, inference and *Āgamās*. The judgments of the *Sākshi* can never be open to doubt. They have to be accepted as veridical. Its validity cannot therefore be upset now or at any time in the future, on the authority of any test purporting to establish that the experiences of the world certified by the *Sākshi* as *Mithyā* (sublated) by monistic consciousness. For even the truth of such a possibility or experience will have to be guaranteed by the *Sākshi*. If the *Sākshi* can be mistaken in its earlier judgment, it can be equally mistaken in regard to the

monistic experience too. To save the *Sākshi* from this predicament, we have to respect the earlier judgment and explore other ways of interpreting the texts in a way that would do justice to the fact without falsifying the *Sākshyanubhava* about the reality of its experiences of all three *Avasthās* and the reality of world experience. This is the criterion on which the supposed conflict between *Pratyaksha* and *Śruti* is resolved by Madhva.

He makes a distinction between knowledge received through sensory channels and the mind and the intuitive perceptions of the *Sākshi*. The Supersensuous categories like Time and space, the nature of Self and its attributes, pleasure and pain, the mind and its modes are perceived by the *Sākshi*. The perception of time in dreamless sleep (as established by the *Sauṣuptikānubhava*, even when the mind was at rest in *Suṣupti* shows that we have to ascribe its perception to the instrumentality of a special sense-organ that is active, even in dreamless sleep when the mind and other senses are at rest. It is this spiritual sense organ of the Self that is designated by Madhva as *Sākshi*.

सुखादिविषयं स्वरूपभूतं चैतन्येन्द्रियं हि साक्षी इत्युच्यते (N. S.)

*Sukhādiviṣayaṁ svarūpabhūtaṁ  
caitanyēndriyaṁ hi Sākshī ityucyate*

The distinction between *Sākshijñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna* helps Madhva to give a consistent account of both valid and erroneous knowledge and doubt without impugning



the fundamental claims of truth and knowledge to universal acceptance. It is conceded by him that our normal perceptions and judgements are generally correct and valid and that certification by tests is not always necessary. Tests are therefore applied only when validity is desired to be logically ascertained or argumentally established, in cases of reasonable doubt. The acceptance of *Sākshi* obviates the necessity to carry on verification endlessly as *Sākshi* is not only *Jñānagrāhaka* but *jñānaprāmānya grāhaka* in vivid experience without resorting to tests, and *with them* where doubts arise. For, if truth is to be known and judgements of validity are to be passed at any stage of the process of knowledge, it cannot be at any level prior to the gross root level of *Sākshipratyaksha*. From the ultimate point of view, tests of non-contradiction will be helpless without the verdict of *Sākshi*. For non-contradiction may be uncontradictedness so far or non-liability for future contradiction. The latter cannot be asserted on any authority save one's *Sākshi*. The *Sākshi* has therefore to be summoned to vouch for the satisfaction of the condition of there being not only no contradiction so far but of the knowledge, and of the possibility thereof.

It is one of the fundamental convictions of Madhva's philosophy that we human beings are endowed by God with such an unerring instrument of validation of our



knowledge and experiences of life. Not only can the *Ātman* not doubt its own existence or being, as *Śaṅkara* says :

सर्वोप्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति न नाहमस्मीति

*Sarvōpyātmāstityam Pratyēti na nāhamasmīti*

but, he cannot afford to doubt his own most vivid perceptions and innermost experiences such as of pleasure and pain or surrender his competence to decide between truth and error, of the data of his own experiences. As rational human beings, we can neither blindly accept all experiences as true or reject all of them as false and superimposed. We have to sift the true from the false. *Sākshi* is the unsullied and unsulliable instrument of such sifting of evidence. It is man's precious possession which cannot be thoughtlessly surrendered. Tho' Madhva accepts that validity is intrinsic to *Pramāṇas*, defined as *Yathārtham* or *Yathāyasthita-jñeyaviśayikāritvam*, he does not rule out the possibility of erroneous knowledge in one's life. Under ideal conditions of life, of course, errors will have no chance. But the actual conditions of life being what they are, error cannot altogether be eliminated. This leads us to the question, if there is any *Pramāṇa* which can deliver the goods, it is only the discovery and establishment of such a principle that can be regarded as the true fulfilment of the epistemological quest. The attempt to place knowledge on a foundation that will be impregnable

and will not be open to doubt is periodically associated with the philosophy of Descartes in the West. In Indian Philosophy the issue has engaged the attention of different schools from much earlier times. The frequently occurring discussions on *Śvatantra* and *Paratantra* of *Prāmāṇya* are evidence of concern with the moot problem. But unfortunately most of the schools have touched but the fringe of the problem and have not tackled it in all its bearing and in the proper perspective, as we shall see in dealing with Madhva's contribution to the solution of the problem.

The right theory of knowledge is that which admits that truth is organic to knowledge.

ज्ञानं हि भावाभावलक्षणं स्वविषयं सत्वेनावगाहते न असत्वेन  
नाप्युदासीनस्वरूपेण । प्रामाण्यं हि ज्ञानस्य उत्सर्गतः अपवादाच्चान्यथा

*Jñānaṁ hi bhāvābhāvalakṣhaṇaṁ swaviṣayaṁ satvēnāvā-  
gāhatē Na asatvēna Nāpyudāsīnaswarūpēṇa. Prāmāṇyaṁ  
hi jñānasya utsargataḥ apavādāccānyatha.*

If the truth of a cognition is to be dependent on its agreement with some other factor, such agreement again will have to be demonstrated on the basis of a further agreement with some other factor and so on indefinitely.

If the validity of the confirming or corresponding knowledge can be intrinsic, such a distinction could as well be conferred on the knowledge at the first blush. If the func-



tion of agreement (*Samvādapramāṇa*) is just one of removing the grounds of mistrust, the validity of the knowledge in question will turn out to be intrinsic—the agreement merely being sought to clear any obstacles, but not to produce validity as such—

अतोवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् ।

अवाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुतेः ।

*Atō avabōdhakatvēna duṣṭakāraṇavarjanāt*

*abādḥācca pramāṇatvaṁ Vastunyakshādivacchṛtēḥ*

The best proof of the unerring precision and infallibility of *Sākshi* is furnished, says Madhya, by the most intimate and poignant experiences of our life such as of pleasure and pain, of which none has occasion to entertain the least doubt.

सुदृढो निर्णयो यत्र ज्ञेयं तत्साक्षिदर्शनम् ।

इच्छा ज्ञानं सुखं दुःखं भयाभयकृपादयः .....

साक्षिसिद्धं न कश्चिद्धि तत्र संशयवान् क्वचित् ।

*Sudṛḍhō nirṇayō yatra jñēyaṁ tat sākshi darśanam*

*Icchā jñānaṁ sukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ bhayābhayakṛpādayaḥ...*

*sākshisiddham na kasciddhi tatra saṁśayavān kwacit*

The whole of rational existence in the world will be made impossible if the verdict of *Sākshi*, as the ultimate guarantor of all knowledge and validity, is questioned or



is proved to be in the wrong even in one single instance, at any time. The entire basis and superstructure of logic and philosophy, religion and science and every activity of life will be blown up to nothingness as by an atom bomb the moment we dare to question or doubt the verdict of *Sākshi*.

कोपि ह्यर्थो न निश्चेतुं शक्यते भ्रमवादिना ।

भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च यदैवानुभवोपगम् ।

एकस्य भ्रमता तत्र परस्याभ्रमता कुतः ।

साक्षिणोपि व्यभिचारश्चेत् — अत ऊर्ध्वदिवसे अभेदवाक्यस्य भेदः  
अर्थः स्यात् । निर्दोषानुमायाः सदोषत्वं सदोषानुमायाः निर्दोषत्वं  
इत्यव्यवस्था ।

*Kōpi hyarthō na niścētum śakyatē bhramavādinā.*

*Bhramatwamabhramatwaṁ ca yadaivānubhavōpagaṁ.*

*Ēkasya bhramata tatra parasyābhramatā kutaḥ.*

*Sākshiṇōpi Vyabhicāraścēt...—ata ūrdhavadivasē abhēda-  
vākyaśya bhēdaḥ arthaḥ syāt. Nirdōśānumāyāḥ sadōṣatwaṁ  
sadōṣānumāyāḥ nirdōṣatwaṁ ityavyavasthā.*

The deliverances of the *Sākshi* have therefore to be kept above all doubt and vacillation. It has to be recognised as an absolute principle of infallibility, untouched by any breath of uncertainty. The verdict can never be dubious. The reason for this is that it is *Sākshi* which has to decide

whether a particular knowledge is true or false. If it cannot do so, or can go wrong in any instance how can certainty be established at all ? In the interests of stabilisation of the commerce of life, *Sākshi* has always to be accepted as flawless. If that is accepted, it will follow that the reality of the world born out of *Sākshiprāmānya* cannot be questioned. The *Sākshi* carries with it its own validation :

अस्माभिरपि दुःखादिबन्धस्य सत्यतायां साक्षिप्रत्यक्षमेवोपन्यस्तं  
इति हृदयम् ।

आत्मत्वमभ्रमत्वं च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्षिणा ।

स चेत्साक्षी क्वचिदुष्टः कथं निर्णय ईयते ।

तस्मात्सर्वप्रसिद्धस्य व्यवहारस्य सिद्धये ।

साक्षी निर्दोष एवैकः सदाङ्गीकार्य एव नः ।

शुद्धः साक्षी यदा सिद्धः ..... ।

स्वप्रामाण्यं सदा साक्षी पश्यत्येव सुनिश्चयात् ।

*Asmābhirapi duḥkhādibāndhasya satyatāyām  
sākshipratyakshamēvōpanyastam iti hṛdayam.*

*Ātmatwamabhramatwaṁ ca sarvaṁ vēdyaṁ hi sakshiṇā*

*Sa cēt sākshī kwacit duṣṭaḥ kathaṁ nirṇaya īyatē*

*Tasmāt sarvaprasiddhasya vyavahārasya siddhayē*

*Sākshī nirdōṣa ēvaikaḥ sadāṅgīkārya ēva naḥ*

*Śuddhaḥ sākshī yadā siddhaḥ—*

*Swaprāmānyaṁ sadā sākshī paśyatyēva suniścayāt.*



It is idle to contend that the reality of world-experience borne out by the *Sākshi* may be sublated on the authority of some text. For it is the same *Sākshi* that has to bear witness to the fact that there has been such a sublating experience. But, both being the judgments of the same *Sākshi*, how can one sublate the other. Respect for the veracity of the *Sākshi* in regard to the reality of world-experience should therefore counsel us to construe the texts, supposed to state that the world will be sublated, in some other way that will not affect the validity of the earlier verdict of *Sākshi*.

Following the judgment of *Sākshi* we find that reality is apprehended not as one, but as many or manifold. There is no reason to reject the apprehension of the many as an appearance. The theory of appearances can cut both ways. It might reduce everything including ourselves to an appearance, landing us in blank nihilism. It is not a sufficient answer to this that an appearance is inconceivable without at least a perceiver. In advancing such an argument we are only relying on the logic of experience. The same logic would show that an appearance presupposes or requires not merely a perceiving self but a substratum on which the appearance can be superimposed and a prototype of the thing so superimposed. Without these three requisites, no sound theory of appearances can be demonstrated. Philosophers, who would fain dismiss the



panoramic reality of the Universe as an appearance, will have to tackle this problem convincingly. There is no point in their indenting upon and treating us to a series of previous appearances based on recessive superimpositions stretching back to eternity, to explain the present appearance.

Some thinkers have pleaded that it will be much simpler to have only one real and reduce all the rest to an appearance, as it would be superfluous to have so many Reals. Madhva hits back that the many will not cease to be or go out of existence to oblige anyone's fancy.

कल्पनागौरवादेव पदार्थानासुरेव हि ।

*Kalpanāgauravādēva Padārthānāsurēva hi*

It is at this point that we are faced with the philosophical distinction between the Independent and the dependent reals. The Reals cannot all of them be independent lest there should be chaos and strife all round. Neither can all be dependent without one independent principle to control and relate them. The dependents cannot obviously control them. Otherwise there will be a regression of strife and opposition to mutual control that would end in their destroying one another and perishing in the transaction and there will be no reality left in the end.

It is thus very necessary to admit two grades of Reality, the *Satavirā* and *Paravirā*. Granted so much

we know where we are. It is no doubt possible or open to us to classify Reality in some other ways also, such as into positive and negative, (*bhāva* and *abhāva*) eternal and noneternal (*nitya* and *anitya*) or sentient and non-sentient (*cit* and *acit*) or *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. But they will be irrelevant to the aim and purpose of religion and philosophy conceived as *Mokshaśāstra*.

The Upanishads have been interpreted by *Śankara* and his followers in a monistic way. Their writings have left the impression in the minds of people that whatever may be the teaching of the *Vēdās*, the *Sūtrās* and the *Gītā*, the *Upaniṣads*, as such, are unquestionably in favour of an absolute monism (*Ēkātmavāda*) which has come to be regarded as the '*Aupaniṣadam Darśanam*'.

In the interests of the resuscitation of the original Theism of the *Upaniṣads*, which were but a continuation of the Vedic heritage and its illumination, Madhva had to correct this impression and reveal the true trend of the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* by writing fresh commentaries on them and bring into bold relief, their true theistic foundations and superstructure. His commentator *Jayatīrtha* has most impressively summed up Madhva's findings of what constitutes the main lines of Upanishadic philosophy; giving a coordinated picture of their thought currents converging on a grand finale of Vedantic



All the *Upaniṣadic* texts with one voice speak of the glory of *Brahman* which is the abode of infinite auspicious attributes and free from all imperfections. Of these (i) some represent it as endowed with attributes like omniscience, Lordship, inner rulership of the world of matter and souls, magnificence, beauty etc. (ii) Some others represent it as being free from all such limitations as sin, misery, liability to physical embodiment etc. (iii) yet others describe it as being beyond the reach of the mind and speech to bring home to us its comparative inaccessibility (iv) Few others depict it as the only reality that exists, in order that we may all seek it to the exclusion of everything else and all other values of life (v) Some others represent it as the Self of all so that it may be understood as the true source of all existence, knowing and activity of all finite reality. But confused heads miss this true message of Theism running thro' the Vedantic texts and break the unity of their philosophical teaching by introducing invidious distinctions into the body and core of their teaching such as the theory of higher and lower knowledge, *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa Brahman* and of *Pāramārthika* and *Vyāvahārika* points of view of *Mahāvākyās* and non-*Mahāvākyās*.







## LECTURE II

### MADHVĀCĀRYA'S CONTRIBUTION TO VĒDĀNTIC THEISM

— Dr. B.N.K. Sharma

*Dvaita*, *Advaita* and *Viśiṣṭadvaita* are the principal schools of *vēdānta* representing the widest possible points of departure of philosophic thought emerging from the interpretation of the heritage of Hindu religious and philosophical literature. Though, both *Rāmānuja* and *Mādhva* were great Theists, it is to the latter more than to the former that we have to look for a robust and vigourous Theistic exposition of the philosophy of the *Vēdās*, the *Brahmasūtrās* and the *Gīta*. While, *Rāmānuja* conceives of the *Jīvās* as bodily or organic appendages of *Brahman*, *Madhva* regards them as eternal but *Nirupādhi-pratibimbās* of *Brahman*, thereby keeping *Brahman's* transcendence in tact.

Theism presupposes the acceptance of the reality of the world, as the creation of *Brahma* and of the difference between God and Souls. *Rāmānuja* is of course a warm Theist in this aspect. But his Theism suffers from the impact of certain Monistic influences which were perhaps

unavoidable in the process of transition of thought from Absolute Monism to pure Theism which was to reach its culmination and fulfilment in Madhva's *Dvaitadarśana*.

*Rāmānuja's Abhinna-nimittōpādānakaraṇavāda* of *Brahman*, describes *Brahman* as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) or the stuff of which the world is made, while yet admitting '*Acit Prakṛti*' as a distinct ontological entity of the system. This *Acit Prakṛti* can easily and very well discharge the function and roll of the material cause of the world under the impulsion of *Brahman*, from within, without exposing *Brahman*, as such to the risk of becoming a transforming cause, in the process, technically or otherwise. While admitting with the *Sūtrakāra* that the released souls are but entitled to participate in *Brahmā's* creative activity (*jagadyāpāra*), *Rāmānuja* still talks of '*Paramasāmya*' (utmost equality) between *Brahman* and the released souls in Moksha in the matter of their bliss, and not admitting any *Svarūpabhēda* or *Tāratamya* in the nature of souls. Still *Rāmānuja* admits from his predecessors a special category of Souls called '*Nityasūris*' who are ever-free and have not been in bondage at all unlike many other souls. This introduces an element of *Svarūpa-Tāratamya*, in principle, among *Jīvās*, which otherwise *Rāmānuja* is not inclined to accept.

The distinctions between *Mayādā* and *Pustimārgās* introduced by *Vallabhācārya* in his interpretation of the



*Sūtras* are but the corollaries of Madhva's doctrine of *Svarūpatāratamya* in *Bhakti*, tho' the antithesis between *Jñāna* and *Bhaktimārgās* recognised by Vallabha is not acceptable to Madhva. However, the frank admission of *Phalabhēda* in *Mōksha* between *Sāadhanās* of what Vallabha calls the *Maryādā* and *Puṣṭimārga* is a tacit acceptance of the principle of *Tāratamya* in *Mōksha* among the released souls., which has been so consistently and systematically maintained by Madhva in his exposition of the Philosophy of Theism in the *Sūtras*. The *Vidvanmaṇḍana* of Vallabha's son Vithaladas quotes the following verse from Madhva :

अमोहाय गुणा विष्णोराकारश्चिच्छरीरता ।

निर्दोषत्वं तारतम्यं मुक्तानां चापि विद्यते ॥

*Amōhāya guṇā Viṣṇorākārāścicharīratā*

*Nirdoṣatvaṁ Tāratamyam Muktānām cāpi vidyatē.*

As a Theist, Ramanuja, speaks of Brahma's *Ananta-kalyāṇaguṇās*. But when it comes to the ontological relation between Brahman and its countless attributes, he does not go beyond the position that Brahma's attributes are different from its being and are not identical with it as genuine Theism would require. For, to regard Brahma, as essentially different from its sovereign attributes of knowledge, bliss, etc., is to reduce it to an abstraction as the bare substrate of attributes. Even submitting that such

attributes are in an inseparable relation (*apr̥thaksiddhi*) with it. True Theism will have to go in for a more intimate and integral relation between Brahma and its attributes as its *svarūpaviśēṣās*, as envisaged by the *Śr̥ti-Satyam Jñānam Anantaṁ Brahma: Sarvatra ca svagatabhēdavarjitātmā*. This oneness of Brahma with its multiplicity of attributes is one of the mysteries of Divine nature and has been conceived by Madhva through the ontological doctrine of *Viśēṣās*. We shall see more of this in due course.

It is difficult to describe *Śankara* as a Theist, for two very simple reasons that to him the highest conception of *Bhrama* is in terms of its being '*Nirguṇa*', beyond and devoid of all characteristics and predications. But philosophical inquiry into *Brahman*, if it is to be fruitful and worth making, must bring us face to face with some definite knowledge of *Brahman*. No knowledge of *Brahman* is possible without a knowledge of its characteristics. The aim of philosophical inquiry is to have some definite knowledge about the nature of the subject of our inquiry. Whatever that thing is shown to be, as a result of such inquiry, will constitute its nature and attribute. It is conceivable that the inquiry may show that it does not possess those or some of those attributes with which we had earlier invested it. But it will not do to hold that any such inquiry about a real and a truly existing being should ever lead to the



conclusion that it possesses no characteristic whatever, that it is wholly and absolutely uncharacterisable. Even the distinction from all 'empirical attributes' (*nēti nēti*) is after all a definite characterisation by negation of empirical attributes. In any event, it would not remain '*Nirviśēṣa*' in a truly philosophical sense. No inquiry can lie about anything that is essentially *Nirviśēṣa*. Madhva therefore posits that as a necessary prerequisite of philosophical inquiry (*Jijñāsā*) it must be agreed that Brahman must be *Saviśēṣa*, i. e., has a distinctive character of its own.

इदमित्थमिति ज्ञानं जिज्ञासायाः प्रयोजनम् ।

इत्थंभावो हि धर्मोऽस्य न चेन्न प्रतियोगिता ॥

*Idam itthaṁ iti jñānaṁ jijñāsāyāḥ prayōjanaṁ,*

*Itthambhāvō hi dharmōsya No cēna pratiyōgitā*

No being can have a purely negative character. It may be negative from the point of view of others: but in itself it must be something more than a mere negation of everything else. This is what is meant by saying *Brahma* is '*Saviśēṣa*'.

Moreover, those who posit two aspects of Brahman—the *Nirguṇa* noumenally and the *Saguṇa* Phenomenally, to explain the creation of the world and other matters, are virtually taking away the infinitude of Brahman by such compromises. For the *Brahman* is always the



infinite. Now Brahman limited by *Māyā* is *Īśvara* or the *Saguna*. *Māyā* is something that is in the nature of an obscuring principle. It would obscure Brahman to some extent and make it forget its pure being and engage in creation etc. If *Saguna* retains its full consciousness of its identity with the *Nirguṇa*, the principle of *Māyā* would serve no purpose and would be superfluous as the *Śuddha-Brahman* can itself act directly without recourse to *Māyā*. *Īśvara* moreover perceives the differences in the world, which He will not do if He were sure of his identity with the *Nirguṇa-Nirviśēṣa*. If *Īśvara* is not sure of His identity with the *Nirguṇa*, the statement of *Gītā* -

ब्रह्मणो हि प्रतिष्ठाहं अमृतस्याव्ययस्य च ।

*Brahmaṇō hi pratisṭhāhaṁ amṛtasyāvya-yasya ca*

as understood by *Śāṅkara* himself will lose its point.

For these and other reasons *Madhva* feels that any association of *Māyā* with *Brahman*, will make a serious inroad on *Brahman's Pūrṇatva*, implying, as it would some sort of diminution of his authentic being and a defect.

कथं मायाव्यवच्छिन्नः पूर्णो मुख्यतया भवेत् ?

*Katham Mayāvyavacchinnaḥ Pūrṇō mukhyatayā bhavēt ?*

The only way to avoid these defects is to give up the artificial distinction of *Brahman* into '*Śuddha*' and '*Māyāsambandha*' and stick to a *Brahma* which is always

'Pūrṇa' and therefore endowed with all the auspicious attributes of omniscience, all-creatorship (*sarva-kartṛtva*) and acting of its own free will (*svēcchāpravṛtti*).

The *Śrītis* speak of many attributes which characterise *Brahman*. In the *Brahmasūtras*, too, characteristics like 'other than being empirically knowable' (*adrśya*) are applied to it. If such negative attributes could be present in *Brahman* and can be posited of it, why not positive attributes like omniscience ?

यदि स्युस्तादृशा धर्माः सर्वज्ञत्वादयो न किम् ?

*Yadi syustādrśā dharmāḥ Sarvajñatvādayō na kim ?*

The Advaita philosopher would have it that even all knowingness of *Brahman* presupposes association with *Avidyā* rather than repel it .

सर्वज्ञत्वमप्यविद्यावत्वमाक्षिपति न तु प्रतिक्षिपति ।

*Sarvajñatvam api avidyāvatvaṁ ākskipati, Na tu pratikshipati*  
But We find in the famous passage of *Bṛahadaranyaka Upanisad* wherein reference is made to *Brahman*, as it existed all by Itself in its own pristine purity, glory and self-sufficiency before the creation of the world and that it knew itself to be *Brahman* the infinite.

ब्रह्मा वा इदमग्र आसीत् तदात्मानमेवावेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति ।

*Brahmā vā idamagra āsīt, Tadātmānamēvā-*

*vēdāham Brahmasmīti.*



The function of an attribute is to describe a thing as it is. This may be done positively or negatively. In the *Śrītis*, We have texts which ascribe positive characteristics like *Satyakāmatva*, *Satyasaṅkalpatva* to Brahman as well as negative attributes like '*apahatapāpmatva*' or freedom from limitations etc. It makes no difference to the characterisability (*saviśēṣatva*) of Brahman whether the characteristics ascribed to it are positive or negative. *Maṇḍana Miśra* has tried to put in that negative attributes will not upset the unity of Brahman and can therefore be accepted:

*Abhāvarūpadharma nādvaitaṁ nighnanti.*

But will not the fact of Brahman's being so qualified or characterised by negative attributes involve a positive characterisation of having negative attributes (*abhāvadharmaviśēṣatvam*) ?

अनृताद्यभावोपलक्षितस्वरूपत्वं नाभावविशिष्टो वाक्यार्थ इति चेत् —

उपलक्षितत्वविशेषः केन वार्यते, स्वरूपत्वं, अखण्डार्थत्वं वाक्यार्थत्वं च

*Anṛtādyabhāvōpalakshitasvarūpatvaṁ nābhāvaviśiṣṭo*

*Vakyārthaḥ iti cēti Upalakshitatvaviśēṣaḥ kēna vāryatē,*

*Svarūpatvam. Akhaṇḍārthatvam vākyārthatvam ca ?*

—(Trivikrama Pandita)

If our anxiety is to safeguard the unity of Brahman, in relation to its attributes and integrate them with Brahman's unity of being, we must explore some other



ways of retaining the attributes and integrating them with the unity of Brahma's being and not do away with them to preserve its unity. The doctrine of *Saviśēṣabhēda* suggested by Madhva is worth consideration from this angle.

Advaita would regard all attributes ascribed to Brahman in the *Śrīti*s as superimposed (*adhyāsta*). But as Madhva points out, even the superimposition of attributes is possible only when certain other conditions are satisfied,-- such as the presence of some general features or character in the given substance such as 'thisness' or 'thatness' upon which the superimposition of other attributes come to be made, as well as a knowledge of the prototype (*prdhāna*) of the object superimposed and its property and an element of resemblance between the substance and the *ārōpya*. How then is it possible for us to say a thing like Brahman, which is by hypothesis bereft of all characteristics, becomes the subject of superimposition ?

धर्मारोपोऽपि सामान्यधर्मादीनां हि दर्शने ।

इदं तदादिधर्मत्वे धर्मोऽन्यः कल्प्यतेऽत्र हि ।

सर्वधर्मविहीनस्य धर्मारोपः कः दृश्यते ?

*Dharmārōpōpi sāmānyadharmādīnāṃ hi darśanē*

*Idaṃ tadādidharmatvē dharmō anyah kalpyate atra hi*

*Sarvadharmavihīnasya dharmārōpaḥ kva dṛśyate ?*

This raises a penetrating objection against Shankara's theory that Brahman is *Nirguṇa* and *Nirviśēṣā* in essence and in reality but allows that the *Śrītis* recognise the existence of a *Saguṇa* Brahman from the *Vyāvahārika* point of view of *Jijñāsā* and *Upāsanā*. It is however, recognised that there are not really two Brahman but only one and that it is verily *Nirguṇa* in the sense already defined. This same attributeless Brahman comes to be regarded as *Saguṇa* (all-knowing) all creator etc. thro' superimposition of those characteristics.

Madhva raises a pertinent objection to this theory. He shows the logical impossibility of superimposing any empirical attributes on a Brahman that is by hypothesis absolutely attributeless (*nirviśēṣa*). When the silver is superimposed on shell, something more than the mere presence of shell is needed. Besides the perception of the shell, the knowledge of a prototype silver really having the shining of silverness and the awareness of the common property of something white and shining answering to the true silver, experienced outside the present illusory experience, are all required. These conditions are not and cannot be studied in the present case of an attributeless Brahman. There is no real prototype *Saguṇa* Brahman other than the *Nirguṇa* which can be said to possess the attributes of *sarvajñatva* etc., that are to be superimposed on the *Nirguṇa*. Nor any resemblance between the *Nirguṇa*



and such a prototype. There is also no scope for general and specific attributes as such in the attributeless one. Hence, no theory of Superimposed *Saguna* Brahman can hold water. The objections against it are hard to rebut.

In order to doggedly maintain such a theory, a prior superimposition of attributes to account for or facilitate a subsequent one will have to be thought of. That will only lead to an endless regress of superimpositions going back on one another ad infinitum.

Apart from the reasonings indicated above, the *Śrī* too predicate many attributes of Brahman such as reality, consciousness and bliss. Brahman has necessarily to be conceived as having several august attributes. Creatorship of the Universe presupposes a full knowledge of the effects to be brought into being, their accessories, the putting forth of necessary will to accomplish the work and so on. It follows the All-Creator must be All-knowing, all-powerful and capable of accomplishing what He wills to be done (*satyasankalpā*). That is what *Saguna* means.

This is not contradicted by the so called *Nirguṇaśrī*-

एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी ... ।

... साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥

*Ekō dēvaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ Sarvavyāpī ...*  
CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitized by Muthulakshmi Research Academy  
... *Sākṣhī cētā kēvalō nirguṇasca.*



For here, *Nirguṇa* merely expresses the view that Brahman is without empirical attributes. It does not say it has no attributes whatsoever. In that case, the earlier enumeration of a large number of them in the same text would be inexplicable. It is a well known principle of interpretation that a negation of attributes following the predication of a large number of attributes will have to be understood in a restrictive sense so as not to affect the attributes already predicated.

A *Vēdāntic* Theist who recognises Brahman to be endowed with infinite perfections, will have however to explain how he proposes to define Brahman's relationship to His infinite attributes. This is a problem which has no interest to *Śāṅkara* but only to Theists like Ramanuja and Madhva. Ramanuja's explanation is that though Brahman's attributes are different from it, they are 'nevertheless inseparably established' or 'inseparably given' (*apṛthaksiddha*). But then Ramanuja extends the same *apṛthaksiddhi* to the *Jīvas* and *Acit, Prakṛti* in relation to Brahman. It stands to reason that attributes like *Jñāna* and *ānanda* ought to be more intimately related to Brahman as its personal characteristics (*svarūpaviśeṣaṇas*) than substances like *Jīvas* and *Jadaprakṛiti*. It is for this reason, Madhva goes beyond Ramanuja in recognising Brahman's attributes of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and *śakti* as its *Svarūpaviśeṣaṇas* and integrates them wholly with *Brahma* as part and parcel of his being. In this position is in remarkable agreement

with that of his Western contemporary St. Thomas Aquinas that in God the distinction between existence and essence must fall away. God can have no nature or essence distinguishable from His actual existence or being. Here the distinction between existence and essence would have no meaning and consequently the distinction between an attribute and that which is the subject of the attribute, would be meaningless. Of the Divine Being, we can say, as of no other, that it is its own goodness. Its goodness is not adjectival to it because, in it is all the same 'to be, and to be good. While St. Thomas has not elaborated how or by what device this is to be explained, Madhva has given us the link on thought that can achieve this integration :

Madhva derives the idea that the goodness, beauty, grace, *ananda*, *Jñāna* etc. of Brahman are not adjectival to it but are the same as Its essence from the famous text of *Śvēt. Up.*

परस्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।

*Parāsyu śaktirvividhaiva śrūyate*

*swābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca*

In explaining this intimate relation between Brahman and its attributes Madhva has made a significant use of the concept of *Viśēṣa* which is one of the most outstanding contributions to ontology in Indian Philosophy,



for which he deserves the highest recognition. The attributes of Brahman are 'saviśēṣābhinna' with Brahman. They are so to say 'colourfully identical' not colourlessly so. Though identical with Brahman in essence, they admit of being spoken of as its attributes or as adjectival to it by the power of *Viśēṣās*. *Viśēṣa* is the intrinsic power of a thing in itself and it is a self-linking power which makes possible linguistic descriptions based on a distinction of reference without a distinction of essence. (*bhēdahinē tvaparyāyaśabdāntarānīyāmakaḥ*) It is something akin to the concept of identity in difference and embodies the rationale of concept of identity in difference itself. For, without the help of *Viśēṣas* the concept of identity in difference would itself be unintelligible. The concept is bound up with Madhva's ontological theory that a substance is an identity of its aspects.

द्रव्यमेव ततो अन्तविशेषात्मतया स्थितः ।

नानाव्यवहृतेर्हेतुः अनन्तत्वे विशेषतः ॥

*Dravyāmēvā tatō antaviśēṣātmatayā sthitaḥ*

*Nānāvyaṭhārtērhētuh ānantatvē Viśēṣataḥ*

Discussing the ontological relation between Brahman and its attributes Madhva writes in his *Vishnu Tatva Nirṇaya*. 'The attributes and activities of Brahman are the same as its being. They are non-different. There is an intrinsic power in things called *Viśēṣas* by means of



which even in the absence of actual difference a relationship of substance and attributes is rendered possible for purposes of reference thro' *Viśeṣas*:

Just as identity and being identical are one and the same but can still be spoken of as if they are different, so also in respect of B. and its attributes. There would be an endless regress if we are to posit a difference between non-difference and the non-different or difference and being different. Therefore it is best to admit that the same substance essence lends itself to being spoken of as it were different in terms of Substance and attribute thro' the power of *Veśeṣas*, which is regulated by the power of God Himself. The *Viśeṣas* are nothing other than the essence of the substance itself or its power (*śaktiśaktimatōr abhēdaḥ*) This power is self-limiting and self-supporting with regard to itself and with reference to the subject.

The above statements are made by Madhva on the authority of the *Brahmatarka*, a work of the *Pañcarātra* literature not now extant. The doctrine of *Saviśeṣābheda* thus appears to be an article of faith of ancient *Pancaratra* theology. This is confirmed by the description of the *Vyūha* doctrine of the *Pañcarātras* and the relation of the *Vyūhas* to *Parāvāsudēva*. Sankara also speaks of the *Pañcarātrikas* after differentiating the attributes of *Jñāna*, *bala* and others from the *Vyūha* forms and again speaks of these attributes as being identical with the *Bhagavan*.

गुणिभ्यः खल्व्वात्मभ्यः ज्ञानादीन् गुणान् भेदेन उक्त्वा  
पुनरभेदं ब्रूते आत्म एवैते भगवतो वासुदेव इति ।

*Guṇibhyaḥ khalvātmabhyaḥ Jñānādīn guṇān bhēdena  
uktvā punar abhedam būrte Atma evaite Bhagavato  
Vāsudēva iti.*

(*Bhamati*, 2,45ii.)

Madhva undertakes to convince the open-minded that *viśeṣas* must be accepted as a postulate of thought. There are only three possible ways in which the relation between substance and its attributes can be conceived

- 1) that they are absolutely different from each other
- 2) that they are absolutely identical (*abhinna*) or
- 3) that they are both different and identical (*bhinnābhinna*).

These three views have been put forth by the logicians, the Advaitins and the Bhatta-Mimamsakas. Madva shows by argument that every one of these views has ultimately to fall back upon *Viśeṣās*. He therefore makes a strong plea for the acceptance of *Viśeṣās* and *Saviśeṣābhēda* between substance and attributes as a *Sarvatantra-siddhānta*.

Abolsute difference between substance and attributes is not only full of difficulties but cannot also commend itself to our philosophical reason. Is the said difference No.1 different from the terms or identical with them ? In the first case, is difference No.2 also different from



or identical with the terms and so on indefinitely so that we are left with a regress. If difference No. 1 is identical with the terms, it cannot be conceived as the difference of *this* or *that* term as such a distinction would itself presuppose a difference. The terms and their difference would all of them be synonymous. If the said difference were held to be self-supporting the question will be if such self-sufficiency [*svanirvāhakatva*] is different from or identical with the terms and with the act of self-supporting? In the former case, an endless regress is sure to arise and in the latter case the expression '*Nirvāhya* and *Nirvāhaka* (selfsupporter and self supported) and the self-supporting (*svanirvahanam*) involved in the definition of *svanirvāhakatvam* would all be tautological. If it be said that the difference between substance and attributes is naturally endowed with such self-supporting and self-limiting capacity that would be another name for '*Viśeṣās*' and such a power could as well be given to the substance itself at the very beginning instead of to the difference.

If substance and attributes are to be both different and externally related by *samavāya*, the question arises if the *samavāya* relation too is similarly related to the terms by another *samavāya* to the relate and that by another and so on. If *samavāya* is self-linking without the aid of another link, such a self-linking capacity can be given to the substance itself at the very beginning so that



the luxury of giving a place to an additional relation (which is recognised as another '*padārtha*', by the Logicians) can be dispensed with, having regard to the law of economy *Dharmikalpanatō dharmākalpana varā*.

If the difference between substance and attributes is however identical with the relata, there would be no difference left *as such* but only the two terms. In the absence of difference we cannot even speak of them as the *two terms* substance and attribute. If the terms and the differences are identical one may contend that difference alone exists as a matter of fact and no substance or attribute. Difference then between substance and attribute must be accepted *not* as being absolutely identical with the terms but identical with a qualification (*saviśeṣābhēda*) that would preserve all the three of them intact and prevent their overlapping or mutual synonymity. Such a distinction of reference can indeed be most profitably attributed to the substance itself instead of to the relation.

The *Bhēdābhēda* view of substance and attributes is in need of *viśeṣās* at the very outset. Identity and difference (*bhēda* and *abhēda*) being opposites and therefore mutually exclusive, cannot be brought together and conceived to coexist in the same locus without the aid of a mediating factor. Neither of them could therefore be invested with this peculiar power of putting up with its opposite as *bhēdasahiṣṇurabhēdaḥ* or *abhēdāsahiṣṇurbhedaḥ*. Such a peculiar capacity of making the opposites meet will indeed be that of the *Viśeṣā*.

Even supposing that substance and attributes are connected by a relation of *bhēdābhēda* what will be the sort of relation between the identity and the difference mutually and to the relata? If that is also one of *bhēdābhēda* there will be a regress. If the *bhēdābhēda* were to be accepted as *Svanirvāhaka* (self-linking) it could only be so with the help of the peculiar potency in it called *Viśeṣa* for want of a better name. If *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* are different from the terms (*bhēdin* or *abhinna*) there will be a regress. If they are identical, they cannot be represented as 'belonging' to them (*tadiya*) without some kind of a peculiarity. Nor can difference and identity between the terms be again identical with them. If they are, difference and identity will both become identical in their turn which will lead to an absurdity and there will be no possibility of establishing any relation between them.

The doctrine undifferentiated reality (*Akhaṇḍātā*) of Advaita is equally dependent on *Viśeṣās*. This may be illustrated with reference to the famous definitive text (*lakṣhaṇāvākya*) *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ Brahma*, which is in the nature of a judgement and ascribes to it three distinct attributes of reality, consciousness and infinitude or bliss.

It will be necessary to call to aid *Viśeṣās* if the unity of the judgment and the oneness of Brahman in and through the three attributes or predications are to be preserved.



Are the three attributes predicated different ? If they are, we have to admit an element of plurality in Brahman which cannot be. If they are all the same, there will be no need to posit three of them, as any one of them will do. They will thus be synonymous in effect (*paryāya*) and hence tautological. It cannot be there as subtle shades of difference among them, for Brahman by hypothesis is *Nirviśeṣā* in Advaita i.e. without any shade of any kind of difference, plurality or peculiarity. Nor can their employment be defended on the assumption of affirmation through negation of the opposites of unreality, ignorance and limitation or *misery*. Even then there must be some kind of distinction from the opposites negated in Brahman as otherwise the entire negation would be meaningless as applied to Brahman, and an exercise in futility. The distinction from unreality must perforce imply the presence of positive reality in Brahman. Also the distinction from unreality must be distinct from the distinction from non-consciousness and so forth. The doctrine of *Saviśeṣābhēda* between Brahman and its numerous attributes taught in the *Śrīlis* is thus forced upon all thinkers as a universal principle *Sarvatantra-siddhānta*. None who respects the laws of thought can escape it or can do without it.

Madhva has thus contributed a great deal to the problem of the relation between substance and attributes as applied to the relation between the Supreme Being and its metaphysical attributes.

### LECTURE III

#### MADHVA'S SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF ĒKAVIJÑĀNĒNA SARVAVIJÑĀNAM OR THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MANY BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ONE

Dr. B.N.K. Sharma

Madhva's acceptance of two grades of reality as *Swatantra* and *Paratantra* brings him face to face with the problem of the relations of the many to the One mooted in the *Chāndōgya Upaniṣad*. The problem may be raised from two different angles. Should we accept both the One and the many as ontological facts; or can the Many be reduced to the One and if so how ?

The first question whether the one or the many alone would be philosophically sufficient to explain the Universe or whether both have to be accepted as philosophical facts and realities and their mutual relationship and status satisfactorily defined and worked out has been answered in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* long ago:

नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानां एको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।

तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् ॥

*Nityō nityānām cētanaścētanānām*

*Ēkō bahūnām yō yidadhāti Kamām*

*Tamātmaṣṭham yēnupaśyanti tēṣām*



We have seen how Madhva has explained the reason for accepting both the one and the many as components of reality as a whole and defining their status in terms of *Svatantra* and *Paratantra*.

The many belong to the domain of *Paratantra* and the One to that of *Svatantra*. The possibility of any opposition between the one and the many stands ruled out by the very terms of their definition and relationship in Dvaita philosophy.

The subject of the One and the many is first mooted in the *Chāndōgya Upaniṣad*, in the famous discourse of *Uddālaka* to his son *Śvētakētu*. The substance of the teaching according to Madhva is the need to understand the primacy of the knowledge of the one independent Reality of the supreme Being over all finite existence. There is nothing to be gained by an excessive preoccupation with finite reality. It is philosophically sufficient to understand that all finite reality depends on the One Independent Reality for its being and becoming, its powers of knowledge or knowability and functioning. This is the corner stone of Madhva's metaphysics :

स्वतन्त्रं परतन्त्रं च प्रमेयं द्विविधं मतम् ।

After explaining the rationale of this classification, his commentator *Jayatīrtha* offers a profound philosophical advice: that the finite reality when it is known as depending always for its being, becoming and functioning on the One *Svatantra*, such knowledge becomes conducive to *Mōksha*.

परतन्त्रप्रमेयं हि स्वतन्त्रभगवदायत्ततया विदितं निःश्रेयसाय भवति ।  
अन्यथा गङ्गावालुकपरिगणनवदपार्थक्यं तत्त्वसंख्यानं स्यात् ।

*Paratantra-pramēyaṁ hi swatantrabhagavadāyattatayā viditam niśśrēyasāya bhavati. Anyathā gangāvālukaparigaṇanavadapārthakyaṁ tatvasaṅkhyānaṁ syāt.*

The presence of the one in the many leads to the concept of Brahman's *Antaryāmitva* in the *Bṛhadāranya Upaniṣad* and in several others:

य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानमन्तरो यमयति .....

तमात्मस्थं येनुपश्यन्ति धाराः तेषां सुखं शाश्वतम् ॥

मयि सर्वमिदं प्रोतं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव ।

*Ya ātmani tiṣṭannātmānamantarō yamayati.....*  
*Tamātmaṣṭhaṁ yēnupayanti teṣāṁ sukhaṁ śāśwataṁ.*  
*Mayi sarvamidam prōtaṁ sūtrē maṇigaṇā iva.*

Among Pro-Madhva interpreters of the thesis of *Ekavijñānēna Sarvavijñānaṁ*, we have those of the *Brahma-pariṇāmavādins* like *Bhāskarā*, *Vṛttikāra*, *Yādavaprakāśa* and *Rāmānuja*. The Sankara School of Advaita explains



the thesis from the point of view of *Vivartavāda* in which the Cause alone is real and the so called effects are taken to be superimposed on the causal stuff and therefore unreal tho' appearing to be real and different from the cause due to ignorance. This relation is then extended to Brahman and the world of matter and souls.

We have two sets of illustrations in the Up., by which the thesis is sought to be elucidated. The wording of these illustrations does not admit easily of either an actual material cause and effect relationship between the pairs named or of a relation of a substrum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and something superimposed on it (*āropya*).

Acharya Madhva, the first to draw attention to these difficulties.

Acharya Madhva has been the first and the only commentator on the Chan. Up. to draw attention of scholars and critics to the difficulties presented by the wording of the illustrations in interpreting them in terms of a material cause and effect relation between Brahman and the world and in terms of *pariṇāmavāda* or of substratum and an appearance superimposed on it as in *Vivartavāda*. Modern exponents and writers on the Upaniṣad and Indian philosophy still continue to harp on either of these two views and have not shown any curiosity to find out what the other great commentator on the Upaniṣad has to say on the question. They have

remained content with their incuriosity and snug in their complacency.

It will be conceded that the illustrations provided by *Uddālaka* are intended to give the proper clue to the correct interpretation of the thesis. Their wording is as follows:

यथा सोम्य एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन विज्ञातेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं  
स्यात्, एकेन लोहमणिना विज्ञातेन सर्वं लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्यात्. एकेन  
नखनिकृन्तनेन विज्ञातेन सर्वं कार्ष्ण्यसं विज्ञातं स्यात् ।

*Yathā sōmya ekena mṛtipiṇḍena Vijñātena sarvaṁ  
mṛṇmayam Vijñātaṁ syāt, ekena lohamaṇinā Vijñātena  
sarvaṁ lōhamayaṁ Vijñātaṁ syāt, Ekena nakhanikṛntanena  
vijñātena sarvaṁ kārṣṇāyasaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt.*

This is followed by another :

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

*Vācārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadheyam  
mṛttiketyeva satyam.*

## II. DIFFICULTY CREATED BY THE WORDING FOR PARIṆĀMAVĀDA :

Let us now examine how far the wording is consistent and commensurate with the requirements of *Parīṇāmavāda*. It is obvious that there is or can be no material cause and effect relation between one clod of



clay or piece of metal and all objects made of clay or metal in the world. There can be nothing more than similarity between one clod of clay and all objects made of clay in the world. As for the nail cutter, it is itself a small article made of nickel (*Kārṣṇāyasa*) and is not the material cause of anything else. This example is thus absolutely out of place in establishing any cause and effect relation between Brahman and the Universe.

From the point of view of strict material cause and effect relation we should expect *Uddālakā* to have phrased his thesis as :

मृदा विज्ञातया मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्, लोहेन विज्ञातेन  
लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्यात्, कार्णायसा विज्ञातेन कार्णायसं विज्ञातं  
स्यात् ।

*Mrdā vijñātayā mṛṇmayam vijñātaṁ syāt, lōhena vijñātena lōhamayaṁ Vijnātaṁ syāt, kārṣṇāyasā vijñātena kārṣṇāyasam vijñātaṁ syāt.*

instead of messing it up with irrelevant and misfitting words like *Ekā*, *pinda*, *sarva* and *nakhanikṛtana*. The irrelevance and superfluity of the additional words would equally upset the *Vivartavāda* interpretation also in so far

as all objects of clay or metal are not superimposed on one clod of clay or piece of metal., – apart from the question whether the effects ought necessarily be put down as superimpositions or appearances without a reality of their own. The example of the *Nakhanikṛntana* will remain a stumbling block here also, unless we take the liberty of replacing and rewriting it as *Karṣṇāyasa* to avoid the absurdity of the proposition as it is worded.

#### *SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES OF VIVARTAVĀDA.*

*Vivartavāda* would require the sublation of or writing off of the appearance of the snake in the rope when the right knowledge of the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is attained. Consistent with this position and the requirements of *Vivartavāda*, we should expect *Uddālaka* to say *Ēkavijñānēna Sarvavijñānaṁ Naśyati* or *bādhyatē* and the examples too worded accordingly instead of solemnly predicating *Sarvaṁ mṛṇmayam vijñātaṁ bhavati*, *Avijñātaṁ vijñātaṁ bhavati* and so on.

The *Bhāmati* has put in a devious defence of *Śankara's* interpretation. When the rope is known the truth about the snake which has been wrongly apprehended as existing there, comes to be known. For the rope is indeed the truth of the serpent:



रज्वा ज्ञातया भुजङ्गतत्वं ज्ञातं भवति । साहि तस्य तत्त्वम् ।

*Rajwā jñātayā bhujaṅgatatvaṁ jñātam bhavati.  
Sāhi tasya tatvaṁ.*

*Vācaspati* would have been on unassailable ground if *Uddālaka* had cited the illustration of the rope and the snake instead of clay and its products. It cannot be that the example of clay and its products is also a case of superimposition. In fact, it is exactly because it is not a recognised example of the rope and snake type that *Śankara* and his commentators have been put to the necessity of interpreting it as a case of *Vivarta* by calling to aid the other illustration of *Vacārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*. But then the interpretation of *Vacārambhaṇam*... in support of *Vivartavāda* is itself beset with difficulties of grammar and syntax as we shall see.

*Vacaspati*'s argument is more of a quibble. It is only the distinctive properties of things that can be regarded as thier truth in serious thinking and not the substratum of its superimposition. If it is not the truth about real superimposed snakes that the Advaita is talking here, but only of snakes presented in illusions, it must first of all establish that *Uddālaka* has all along been talking to his son of an illusory world of matter and souls in propounding the thesis of *Ekaviṅśatena sarvaviṅśanam*.

# DIFFICULTIES OF THE WORDING IN THE PARIṆĀMAVĀDA INTERPRETATION:

The *Pariṇāmavāda* explains the *Vācārambhaṇa* text as establishing that the cause and the effect are not different substances (*dravya*) as the *Vaiśeṣikās* hold.<sup>1</sup> The effects have their own reality, their own distinctive names and forms and practical utility. However, the effects are formed of the same substance and partake of the same reality. Hence the words *Mṛttikētyēva satyaṃ*.

We have to examine a little more closely what the *Pariṇāma vādin* means by saying that the effects have the same reality as the cause. Does he mean to establish that the effect has the same distinctive essence (*svārūpasattā*) of the cause as against the *Vaiśeṣika* realist (who regards the effect as a different *dravya*)? For one thing, the *Vaiśeṣika* who regards them as different *dravyas* would be the last person to accept their partaking of the same distinctive essence (*Svarūpasattā*). If the cause and effect should have the identical *Svarūpasattā*, they could no longer be differentiated and identified and spoken of as *Upādāna* (cause) and *Upādeya* (effect).

- 
- 1) अत्र काणादमतेन कारणात्कार्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरत्वमाशङ्क्य  
भोरुप्रतीत्यैव कार्यकारणानन्यत्वं उपपादयति वाचारंभणं...

*Atra kāṇādamatena kāraṇātkāryasya dravyāntaratvamā-  
śaṅkya lōkapratītyaiva kāryakāraṇānanyatvaṃ upapā-  
adyati vācārambhaṇam...* (Sribhāṣya II 1-16)





This is a very circuitous construction of the three words *Vācārambhaṇam*, *vikāraḥ* and *nāmadhēyam* which (please note) are found placed in close grammatical apposition of case-forms. The construction attempted by Ramanuja is obliged to import additional words to accommodate an oblique 'anvaya' to elicit his desired meaning. This shows his inability to adhere to the direct syntactic relationship between the three words placed in apposition in the text. Their appositional position indicates that they should be construed without changing their case forms anywhere or adding any new words or suffixes to them. An interpretation which can construe them as they are will have to be preferred. Judging from this criterion the interpretations given by Sankara and Ramanuja fail to satisfy.

#### THE VIVARTA EXPLANATION :

The *Vivartavāda* reduces all effects to appearances without any reality of their own. Hence when the substratum of a superimposition comes to be known, all superimposed appearances are forthwith sublated, and the truth is revealed that the substratum alone is real. Even so, when Brahman is known as it is, the world of appearances is automatically switched off and the underlying truth alone shines forth, as the one and only reality.



This meaning is derived from the words of the proposition *Vācārambhaṇam .. Mr̥ttikētyēva satyam* representing the two sides of the same coin.

*Vikāra* is the modified effects of causal substances like pots made of clay or articles made of metals. Contrary to the popular belief that the causal stuff undergoes a real transformation or change the *Vivartavāda* holds that all such modifications are a mere mode of speech (*Vācārambhaṇam*) and a mere name (*namadheya*). There is no real entity called a modification. Sankara says so in the clearest terms The modifications of clay called a pot or a pitcher are merely said to exist by word of mouth (*Vācārambhaṇam*). There is, in point of fact, no such thing as a modified entity (*vikārah*). It is merely a name (*nāmadhēyamātram hi tat*) and therefore (*unreal-anṛtam*.) The clay alone is true and real. Even so Brahman is the only real and the created world is *not*.<sup>1</sup>

- 1) वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्-वाचा केवलमस्तीत्यारभ्यते विकारः  
घटः शरावः उदञ्चनं चेति । न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम  
कश्चिदस्ति । नामधेयमात्रं हि एतत् अनृतम् । मृत्तिकेत्येव  
सत्यम् इत्येष ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्तः ।

*Vācārambhaṇam Vikārō Nāmadheyaṃ-Vācā Kevalama-*  
*stityārabhyate Vikārah ghataḥ śarāvaḥ udancanaṃ ceti.*  
*Nā tu vastuvṛttena Vikārō nāma Kaścidasti. Nāmadheya-*  
*mātram hi etat anṛtam mr̥ttiketyeva satyam ityeva*  
*Brahmaṇo dṛṣṭāntaḥ.*

(*Śankara's Chand. up. Bhāṣya*)

It will be seen that Shankara has quietly added the word *matram* or its equivalent sense to *Vācārambhaṇam* and *nāmadhēyam* in the Upanisadic text, on his own initiative, to make them yield the meaning he wishes to put upon them to make out that all causation and modification are illusory. This is taking a liberty with the wording of the text as we have it (*aśrutakalpanā*). *vacārambhaṇam* by itself is not synonymous with what is false (*mithya*). If that be so, the works of Valmiki and Kalidasas would all be unreal as they are all modifications of speech (*vācārambhaṇam*). Unable to find a distinct meaning for the other word *nāmadhēyam*, Sankara adds the suffix '*mātram*' to it to make it explanatory of *Vācārambhaṇam* as he has already explained it. This leads to a redundancy. For, after all, *vāk* and *nama* are not far removed from each other. Thus, a change or modification (*vikāra*) according to Shankara is *vācārambhaṇamātram* which is the same as saying it is '*nāmadhēyamātram*'. It cannot be said that there is no redundancy as the intention is to make out that both the *vikāra* and its name are equally false. For, the same word *Vikāra* is capable of denoting both the modification and its name. Moreover as there is no mention of the suffix *mātram* in the text of the Upanisad, its addition is an unwarranted liberty taken. In case *Āb-bhakshō Vāyubhakshaḥ*, he lives on water or air, the context admits of such an addition. But in the



present case there is no such indication to the effect. The emphatic particle *ityēva* following *mṛttikā* (*mṛttikētyēva satyam*) cannot provide any such justification for adding the suffix. For the correct interpretation of the statement is yet to be determined (as we shall see) .

According to the principle of interpretation, recognised by the Vyakarana Sutra *Na vēti vibhāṣa* (Pan. i, I , 44) the particle 'iti' used in a context concerned with the meanings denoted by the words used (*arthaśāstra*) would refer to the word-form to which it is added while in a context of *Śabdaśāstra* as in *Na vēti vibhāṣā*, the reference will be to the sense denoted by the words used. Thus, the technical term *Vibhāṣa* applied to *Na* and *Vā* in the *Sūtra* (*Navēti vibhāṣa*) comes to be restricted to convey the sense of negation with conjoint option and not to the terms *Na* and *Vā* as such. The present context in the Chan. Up. being one of the meanings of words employed, the *iti* added to *Mṛttikā* would stand for the word-form *Mṛttikā* as such and not for its meaning :

न वेति विभाषा इत्यत्र इतिकरणः क्रियते । सोऽर्थनिर्देशार्थो भवति । तद्यथा गौरित्ययमाहेति गोशब्दादितिकरणः प्रयुज्यमानः गोशब्दं स्वस्मात् पदार्थात् प्रच्यावयति सोस्मात्प्रच्युतः शब्दपदार्थकः संपद्यते ।  
( महाभाष्यम् )

*Na vēti vibhāṣa ityatra itikaraṇaḥ kriyāte Sa arthanir-dēśārthō bhavati. Tadyathā gaurityayamāheti gōśabdā-*  
CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitized by Muthulakshmi Research Academy

*ditikaraṇaḥ prayujyamānaḥ gōśabdaṁ swasmāt padārthāt  
 pracyāvayati. Sōsmātpracyutaḥ śabdapadārthakaḥ sam-  
 padyate.* ( *Mahābhāṣyaṁ* )

Following this principle of interpretation given by Patanjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* the term *iti* added to *Mr̥ttikā* in the discourse of *Uddālaka* to his son would refer to the word-form *Mr̥ttikā* and not to its meaning of clay. As Śāṅkara wishes to convey that the substance 'clay' is alone real and not its modifications, the right and proper way of expressing such an idea would be to say *mr̥ttikaiva satyaṁ (na tu vikārōpi)*. The use of the particle 'iti' after '*mr̥ttikā*' by *Uddālaka* comes in the way of the *Vivartavada* interpretation. It will not do to say that the 'iti' is intended to signify the specific feature or modality of clayness. For it is clay as such and not its modality or clayness that happens to be the *Upādānakāraṇa* of pots. The reference to the modality of the *Upādāna* (*Prakāra*) is therefore irrelevant. Thus the *Vivarta* interpretation of *Uddālaka's* teaching is beset with difficulties.

### NEED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FRESH INTERPRETATION

The difficulties of logic, wording and syntactic relations of words in the illustrative passages to which the *Pariṇāma* and *Vivarta* interpretations of the thesis of *Ēkavijñānēna Sāryavijñānaṁ* are open, should make us pause to consider



seriously if there is any other philosophical stand point from which the thesis can be explained in keeping with the presence and deliberate use of the words *eka*, *piṇḍa*, *sarva* and *nakhanikṛntana* in the first set of illustrations and which will stick to the grammatical apposition of the three words *Vācāraṁbhaṇam*, *Vikāraḥ* and *nāmadhēyam* and will not resort to the adding of a new word *mātram* to *nāmadhēyam* or go in for an oblique syntactic connection of the words and will be in a position to offer a sustainable explanation of 'iti' in *Mṛttikā* 'iti'.

It is here that Madhva's interpretation which meets all these requirements deserves our attention. The main feature of Madhva's interpretation is that it explains the thesis of *Ēkavijñānēna Sarvavijñānam* in keeping with the reality of the world of matter and souls as finite realities in terms of the primacy of the one supreme Being which is the source of all being and becoming and functioning of finite reals bearing some measure of similarity to the Supreme in respect of some of their attributes.

The primacy of Brahman is brought out as pointed out by Madhva in the opening section of the VI *adhyāya* itself of the Chan. Up. in which Uddalaka describes at length how Brahman alone exists prior to world-creation as the One and Only Independent Being (*Sadēva idamagra āsit ekaṁ eva advitīyam*) and how this supreme being sets

in motion the cosmic evolution by its will and brings about the triplication of the three subtle elements. (*tējōabanna*) by way of *Trivṛtkaraṇam* and enters into the evolutes to sustain them and unfold their potentialities of name and form (*Anēna Jivēna ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpē vyākaraṇam*). This complete picture of the dependance of all finite reality on the supreme Brahman for its evolution and progressive development is striking evidence of Brahman's primacy as the source of all the possibilities in the womb of finite reality. To know the Brahman as the primary source of the *sattā*, *pratīti* and *pravṛtti* of all finite reality is and must be the true purpose of life and mastering the Vedic lore. The Upaniṣad speaks of the conceited bearing of *Śvetaketu* returning with his head stuffed with the letter of Vedic lore without having realised their spirit in terms of the primacy of the supreme Being and the dependence of all finite reality on such a Being. Thus the context too gives an unmistakable indication of the real drift of the *ādeśa* of *Uadālaka*.

सर्वान् वेदानधीत्य महामना अनूचानमानी स्तब्ध एयाय  
इत्यात्मनोऽन्यं अनूचानत्वादिगुणप्रदं परमविज्ञाय स्तब्धस्य पराधीनत्व-  
ज्ञापनेन स्तब्धतां निरस्य तन्निष्ठादि अत्रोपदिश्यते ( M.V.T.N. )

एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं च ब्रह्मणो जगत्प्रति प्राधान्यं जगतः  
सत्तादि किंचित्सादृश्यं जगन्निमित्तकारणत्वं च हेतुनाभिप्रेत्योक्तम् ।  
न च जगतः सत्ताद्यत्वेन विना तस्य जगत्प्रति प्राधान्यं सिध्यति ।



तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं निमित्त कारणत्वामिप्रायेण सृष्टिकथनं सङ्गतमेव ।

( J. V.T.N. Teeka )

*Sarvān vedānadhītya mahāmanā anūcānamānī stabdha-  
eyāya ityātmanō anyam anūcānatvādiguṇāpradam Paramavi-  
jñāya stabdhasya parādhiṇatvajñāpanena stabdhatām  
nirasya tanniṣṭhadī atrōpadīsyate* (M. V.T.N)

*Ēkavijñānena sarvavijñānam ca Brahmanō jagatprati  
prādhānyam, jagataḥ sattādi kiñcitsādrśyam jagannimitta-  
kāraṇatvam ca hetunābhipretyōktaṁ. Na ca jagataḥ tadvaśa-  
twena vinā tasya jagatprati prādhānyam siddhyati. Tad-  
vaśatvajñāpanārtham nimittakāraṇatwābhiprāyena śrṣṭi-  
kathanam saṅgatameva.* ( J. V.T.N. Teeka )

As the final source of cosmic evolution and its sustenance the Supreme Being is the Author (*Jagannimittakāraṇam*). It must be remembered here that the term *Nimittakāraṇa* as applied to Brahman in Madhva's *Vedāntadaraśna-dṛṣṭi* has a much wider and deeper significance and range of meaning than the restricted role of world-Potter (*Brahmāṇḍakulāla*) assigned to God in the *Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika* realisms. In Madhva's philosophical terminology, it stands for the source of all being and becoming consciousness and power of functioning of all

As the concept of *Ēkavijñānena Sarvavijñānam* is a value-concept, it is not to be understood literally but liberally. It signifies that the benefits derived from the domain of the *Karmakāṇḍa* and propitiating the various Gods through Sacrifices are far less and transitory in their nature as compared with the knowledge and devotion to the supreme independent Being which is the primary purport of all Vedic lore. It is enough to know the finite world as being always dependent on the Supreme. When the Lord is known and is pleased, the gods too are as good as pleased. The finite reality must be attuned to the Supreme Reality;

प्रधानज्ञानादप्रधानस्य ज्ञानवद्व्यपदेशोऽस्त्येव । फलापेक्षया  
एतदुक्तम् । कर्मदेवताविषयश्रवणमननविज्ञानानुष्ठानपूजादिना यत्फलं  
तत्सर्वमधिकं च भगवत्छवणादिना एव लभ्यते । ततस्तदेव कार्यं  
लाघवात् आधिक्याच्च । अतः तत्रैव युक्तेन भवितव्यम् ।

( J. V.T.N.T. Teeka p. 70 )

*Pradhānajñānādapradhānasya jñānavadyapadeśaḥ  
astyeva. Phalāpekshayā etaduktam. karmadevatādiviśaya-  
śravaṇamananavijñānānuṣṭhānapūjādīnā yatphalam tat sar-  
vam adhikam ca bhagavatśravaṇādīnā eva labhyate. Tatasta-  
deva kāryam lāghavāt ādhikyācca. Atah tatraiva yuktena  
bhavitavyam.*

( J. VTNT. p. 70 )

Even the limited knowledge of a small thing like a  
nail scissor makes known many other things.



same stuff. How much more should a knowledge of so great a Being as the Lord of all creation be able to reveal to us about the nature of finite reality which in comparison with the Lord is so small and insignificant.

सारतो जगतः कृत्स्नादतिरिक्तो जनादेनः ।

*Sāratō jagataḥ kṛtsnādatiriktō janārdanaḥ.*

The second illustration of *Vācāraṁbhaṇam nāma-dheyam...* is explained by Madhva as a linguistic and philological analogy intended to emphasise the primacy of the knowledge of the supreme Brahman. The argument turns on the relative status importance of words in common conventional currency in popular speech as compared with words of the Vedic vocabulary such as *Mṛttika*.

It would be useful to keep in mind the Vedantic position that the Vedas are *Apauruṣeya* i.e., authorless and eternal. The words of the Vedic vocabulary are therefore unborn, uncreated and are *Nitya* unlike words of popular *Prākṛt* speech which are conventional (*sāṅketika*) and are actually produced by their utterance (*Vācāraṁbhaṇam*), while the Vedic words like *Mṛttikā* being eternal (*nitya*) are only manifested by utterance. We have already seen that the '*Itikaraṇa*' after *Mṛttika* requires us to take it that the reference is to

the word-form *Mṛttikā* and not to the sense of the word *Mṛttikā*. Since words current in all languages classical or regional, Vedic or non Vedic are equally real, there will be no point in describing the Vedic form *Mṛttikā* alone as 'Satyam'. Hence the term *Satyam* in this context as applied to the word *Mṛttikā* will have to be understood in the higher sense of what is eternal (*nityam*). Madhva has cited, evidence from Chan.Up.VIII.1, 5 showing the use of the term *Satyam* in the sense of *Nityam*. Here the supreme Brahman (*or the pure self according to Shankara*) present in the body of *jīvas* is described as 'Satyam' as it does not decay when the body decays and is not killed when the body is killed. It will not be proper to give the meaning of real to Satyam in this context which speaks of growing, aging, being subject to decay and destruction of the body, and the non-destruction, decay or growth of the self (or Brahman). As only real things can be subject to growth, decay and destruction and unreal things cannot be so described, the description of the self or Brahman as 'Satyam' must necessarily be taken to mean eternal existence in the same form. The declaration *Mṛttikētyēva Satyam* as applied to the Vedic word *Mṛttikā* can without any further difficulty be understood to signify its eternality, thereby



establishing the primacy of the words in the Vedic speech. By virtue of their primacy and preeminence, words of the Vedic speech have wider currency and serviceability all over the land as against the limited currency and serviceability of words of conventional speech. Evidently Vedic speech enjoyed such a status in the Upanishadic period qualifying for the analogy. A parallel to this may be seen in the position enjoyed by the English language in various parts of India even today where different regional languages are spoken by the people at large.

It may be that Madhva's exposition of the thesis of *Ēkavijñānena sarvavijñānam* in the light of the linguistic analogy based on the use of the term *Mṛtikā iti* in the distinctive sense, which has to be assigned to it by the ruling given under the sutra 'Na veti vibhāṣa' in respect of *Itikarṇa* is unfamiliar to modern scholars and students of the Upanisads. But then it is their fault and not Madhva's. Perhaps part of responsibility for it has to be shared by the present day followers of Madhva whose primary responsibility it is to give proper and adequate publicity to his views on various problems discussed by the Upanisads, so that all points of views may be brought together and taken into account to make a final assessment. That is a task to which an Institute like **Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Academy** must

address itself more and more and dispel the blissful ignorance that prevails both at home and abroad concerning the many seminal contributions which Madhva philosophy has made to the standing problems of Indian Philosophy.

I wish the Foundation Godspeed in this direction.





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## LECTURE IV

### THE THEISM OF THE UPANIṢADS IN ITS ORIGINAL PERSPECTIVE.

The influence of Sankara's Advaita philosophy in Vedanta and the writings of modern exponents of Advaita, since the days of Vivekananda, have predisposed our present generation of scholars and laymen to believe that the prevailing note of Upaniṣadic philosophy is 'Monistic' - in a sense nearest to Sankara's interpretation of it, in the light of *Ekātmavāda*. *Avidyā* and *Adhyāsa*.

Sankara has attempted to make capital out of the ambiguity of the connotation of the term 'Atman' so often to be met with in the Upaniṣads - and represents their philosophy as that of the individual self in its pristine purity. Their rich and colourful legacy of Theistic material which have come down from the Upaniṣads have therefore been relegated to the sphere of empirical musings and lower knowledge intended for *vyāvahārika* consumption,<sup>1</sup> with almost a magician's sleight of hands.

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1. न हि वियदादिप्रपञ्चसृष्टिः प्रतिपिपादयिषता नापि तत्प्रतिबद्धः  
कश्चित्पुरुषार्थो दृश्यते श्रूयते वा मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः ...

*Na hi viyadādiprapañcasṛṣṭiḥ pratipipādayiṣatā nāpi  
tatpratibaddhaḥ kaścitpuruṣārtho dṛśyate śrūyate vā*



Sankara in the preamble to his *Sūtrabhāṣya* substitutes the investigation of the nature of the individual self in the place of *sūtrakāra*'s call for *Brahma - jijñāsā* - and takes his readers completely by surprise by declaring: *Ātmā ca Brahma*.

But the fact remains that the *sūtrakāra* holds that the *Brahma Mimāṃsā śāstra* is concerned with the inquiry into and realisation of the nature and attribute of Brahman - 'the *Jijñāṣya*' - the *Jīvātman* remaining throughout as the *Jijñāsuḥ*. In keeping with this objective, the *Sūtrakāra* takes care to define his Brahman as the author of the world and souls and its sustenance, dissolution, control, bondage and release of souls:

In the course of his work he has also given us sufficient indications that he understands the other word 'Atman' occurring in the Upanisads very often and also used by himself in his own work in some of the crucial contexts of his work such as in the *Dyubhāvādyadhikaraṇam* in the primary sense of the Supreme being and not in the commonly accepted conventional sense of the individual self. The *Sūtrakāra* makes it clear that he does not accept the merger of the individual soul in the supreme Brahman, when he denies to the released soul in Sutra N. 4. 17. the power of cosmic creation, dissolution etc. which have been recognised by him in Sutra N. 1. 1. 1. as the exclusive right and prerogative of the

Supreme Brahman to be investigated. Thus the direct hot line connection operating between second Sutra and sutra 10. 4. 17 will be enough to convince any one that the Sutrās of *Bādarāyaṇa* which are the earliest and most authentic Systematisation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads:

वेदान्तकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात्सूत्राणां वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदा-  
हृत्य विचार्यन्ते -

*Vedāntakusumagrathanārthatvātsūtrāṇām vedānta-  
vākyaṇi hi sūtrairudāhṛtya Vicāryante. [ S. 1-1-2 ]*

do not establish the position that *Ekatmānvāda* or the oneness of the individual soul with Brahman is the true philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Sankara has therefore been forced to override the Sutrakara's position in several contexts of Sutrās and explain them away. He therefore brings the entire repertoire of Theistic philosophy of the Upaniṣads under the purview of his philosophical methodology of *Adhyārōpa - Apavāda nyāya* ( predication for the sole purposes of subsequent repudiation ) He has naturally adopted the same method in his interpretation of the Sutrās also. But the point is that an objective study of the *Upakrama* and *Upasamhāra* of the sutras does not support the view that the Sutrās have been constructed on the basis of such a methodology. A conjoint view



of the opening and the concluding Sūtras of Badarayana, as has been pointed out earlier, is enough to establish this point. A bird's eye view of the closing statement of many of these Upaniṣads too confirms the survival of the individual self in the released state.

अग्ने नय सुपथा राये ... (Isa)

अनन्ते स्वर्गे लोके ज्येये प्रतितिष्ठति, प्रतितिष्ठति (Kena)

ब्रह्मप्राप्तो विरजोऽभूद्विमुक्तिरन्योऽप्येवं यो विदध्यात्ममेव  
(Katha)

एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रम्य एतत्सामगायन्नास्ते हावुहा ...  
(Tait. up.)

तान् पुरुषो मानव एत्ये ब्रह्मलोकान्गमयति तेषु पराः

परावतो वसन्ति तेषां न पुनरावृत्तिः (Brih. up.)

स एतेन प्राज्ञेनात्मनाऽस्माल्लोकादुत्क्रम्याऽमुष्मिन् स्वर्गे लोके  
सर्वान्कामानाप्त्वाऽमृतः सम्भवति ...

*Agne naya supathā rāye ..... (Iśh)*

*Anante swarge lōke jyeye pratitiṣṭhati pratitiṣṭhati*  
(Kena)

*Brahmaprāpto virajōbhūdvimuktiranyōpyevam yo*  
*vidadhyātmameva* (Katha)

*Etamānandamayamātmānamupasaṅkramya Etatsāma-*  
*gāyannāste. hā vu hā .....* (Tait. Up.)

*Tān puruṣo mānava etye brahmalokān gamayati*  
*teṣu parāḥ parāvato vasanti teṣām na punarāvṛttiḥ*  
(Bṛha. Up.)

*Sa etena prājñenātmanāsmāllokādutkramyāmuṣmin  
swarge lōke sarvān kāmānāptvāmṛtaḥ sambhavati.*

Thus, the entire physiognomy of Upanisadic thought assumes a different shape if in the higher contents of its use in the Upanisads the term *atman* is uniformly understood in its higher and primary connotation of the Supreme Being - the author of all creation and the goal of the liberation. Take for instance the statement

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः

*Tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*

in Tait. Upanisad. The sentence immediately preceeding this is

ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परं ... सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म

*Brahmavidāpnoti param ... satyam jñānamanantam brahma.*

Here the words- *Tasmādātmanaḥ*- obviously refers to the top Brahma which is *Satyam Jñānāmanantam*. It is not therefore possible to refer to the individual self who comes into the picture of creation much later as *Puruṣo annarasamagnaḥ*. Another crucial instance of the use of Atman in its indisputable primary sense of Brahman can be seen in the opening passage of the Ait. Up.

आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्



The use of the word Atman in both its primary and in its conventional senses of the Supreme Brahman and the individual self is to be seen in the famous passage of the Brh. upaniṣad in the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*—

य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति एष ते आत्मा  
अन्तर्यामी --- —

*Ya Ātmani tiṣṭhan Ātmānamantarō yamayati eṣa te ātmā antaryāmī. — —*

‘Atman’ referred to in the locative case *Ātmani* and the accusative *Ātmānam* is the individual self and the Atman used in the nominative case and designated as the Indwelling Controller of this Atman is the Supreme Being (*Paramātman*).

The Upanisads have devoted a good deal of space to cosmological matters-- These have later crystallized in the Vedantic systems as *Vivartavāda*, *Pariṇāmavāda* and *kēvala-nimittakāraṇavāda*. The alternative to *Vivartavāda* need not necessarily be *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*, in which Brahman itself actually transforms into the world. Since *vivartavāda* reduces the panorama of cosmic creation to an appearance and a superimposition (*ārōpa*) and since *Brahmapariṇāmavāda* exposes Brahman’s essential nature of purity, changelessness and bliss to one of change, Brahma’s modification and diminution, it is inconsistent with authentic being of *Nityasuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva*. As

the Upaniṣads mean a very real creation, real sustenance, real dissolution, real control, real obscuration, real ignorance, real knowledge and real disruption of bondage and enjoyment of real bliss in *Mokṣa* when they say—

स इदं सर्वममृजत । कविर्मनीषी परिभूः । स्वयंभूः याथा-  
तथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधात् शाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः । (Īśa) एतस्य वा  
अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गिसूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः ।

*Sa idam sarvamasrjata. Kavirmanīṣī paribhūḥ. Swaya-  
mbhūḥ yāthātathyatōrthān Vyadadhāt Śāśvatībhyaḥ Smā-  
bhyaḥ. (Iśa) Etasya Vā aksharasya praśāsane gārgisūryā  
candramasau Vidhrtau tisthatah.*

It follows that the only theory of creation which will be compatible with the reality of the created world and the independence of the creator would be to reject both the *Brahmōpādānavāda* and *Vivartavāda* and accept God's *Nimittakāraṇatva* only—by enlarging the meaning of the term: *Nimittakāraṇa* so as not to restrict or diminish the metaphysical independence of the Lord, in any way.

It is such a revised and enlarged conception of *Nimittakāraṇa* that Mādhva philosophy offers in place of the *Nyāya* view of it. In the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* theory of atomic genesis, the atoms are all conceived as eternal entities existing independently of God. This reduces the role of God to that of a glorified Potter. *Brahmāṇḍakulāla*



who has no control over the material supplied to him and those materials or their distinctive properties exist independently of him and do not owe their existence to him. His freedom is greatly restricted by the external factors over which he has no control. The *Sēśvara Sāṅkhya* or *yōga* theory places the role of God in creation on no higher level than that of being an auxiliary cause-*Sahakāri-kāraṇa*- just like rain in its production of crops:

ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवत् द्रष्टव्यः ।

*Īśvarastu parjanyaavat draṣṭavyaḥ.*

Madhva's conception of the role of God in creation is much higher in that he makes the Lord the source of the *Bijaśakti* of *Puruṣa* and the *Upādāna śakti* of *Prakṛti* - so far as the *Sāṅkhya* view is concerned. The atoms and their properties too are as much in his control:

अन्यत्र क्वापि शक्तिर्न स्वातन्त्र्येणेश एव हि ।

सत्ताप्रदाता पुरुषः शक्तानां च प्रतीतयः ॥

प्रवृत्तमाश्रितास्सर्वा नित्यं नित्यात्मना यतः ।

शक्तीस्थः प्रेरयत्येषः तदधीनाश्च सर्वदा ॥

*Anyatra kwāpi shaktirna swātantryeṇeśa eva hi  
Sattāpradātāpuruṣaḥ śaktānām ca pratitayaḥ.*

*Pravṛttamāśritāḥ sarvā nityam nityātmanā yataḥ  
Śaktīsthaḥ prerayatyeṣaḥ tadadhīnāśca sarvadā.*

Madhva therefore defines Gods role as: *Nimittakāraṇa* in respect of the genesis, subsistence, dissolution, orderly development and progress of the world of matter and souls in terms of His being the ultimate source of the being and becoming the conscious life and functioning of all that is there in the womb of matter and the spirits

सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्

*Sarvasattāpratītipravṛttinimittam*

As the lord is by hypothesis *Svatantra* in the sense of being entirely self—sufficient, He is able to realise His will as He deems fit.

In this connection, following Madhva, Jayatirtha has impressively brought out the difference between the role of God as *Nimittakāraṇa* in the *Nyāya* and *Dvaita* view.

यदुक्तमीश्वरस्य कारणोपादाननियमोऽस्ति न वेति तत्रास्तीति  
ब्रूमः । तथाच प्रकृत्यादीनां कारणत्वं युक्तम् । स च नियमो न  
कुलालादिरिव तान्यपहाय व्यत्यस्यवाकरणे शक्त्यभावनिबन्धनः येन तस्य  
स्वातन्त्र्यमन्येषामस्वातन्त्र्यं च न स्यात् । किं नाम स्वेच्छानियमत एव ॥

*Yaduktamīśvarasya kāraṇopādānaniyamōsti na veti  
tatrāstīti brūmaḥ. tathā ca prakṛtyādīnām kāraṇatvam  
yuktam. sa ca niyamo na kulālādiriva tānyapahāya vya-  
tyasyavākaraṇe śaktyabhāvanibandhanah yena tasya  
swātantryamanyeṣamaswātantryam ca na syāt. Kim nāma*



Because the lord makes use of certain recognised material and efficient causes in His creation, it does not mean He cannot do without them or change their order or sequence. He has chosen to follow a certain method not under any force of circumstance, but at His own pleasure— by way of a self-limitation if we may say so.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* develops the concept of Brahman as '*Sarvāntara*' penetrating all— being immanent in all. As we cannot speak or conceive of Brahma as being inside all penetrating all and being immanent in all without conceding the real existence of the 'all' to be permeated by Divine presence the *Sarva* cannot be *Sarvāntara* nor can *Sarvāntara* be *Sarva*. Brahman cannot also be both *Sarva* and *Sarvāntara* in the same sense. If Brahman is really to be *sarvāntara* it must be distinct from all else. One of the esoteric names of Brahman is

अ इति ब्रह्म तत्रागतमहमिति

*Ā iti brahma tatrāgatamahamiti* — — II 3.8

आकारोऽन्त्याभावविरुद्धवाची

*Ākāro antyābhāvaviruddhāvācī*

अ 'A' in the Sanskrit language —

As explained by Madhva it postulates three great philosophical truths

अ इत्ययं शब्दः प्रस्तुतस्याभावं विरोधिनमन्यं च वदति, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षत्वात् जीवजडात्मकस्य जगत एव ( अनुक्तावपि प्रस्तुतत्वात् ) तदन्यतद्विरोधि तत्र दृश्यमानदोषवर्जितश्च अकारार्थ इति सिध्यति ।

*A ityayam śabdah prastutasyābhāvam virodhina-manyam ca vadati, tasmāt pratyakshatvāt jīvajadātmakasya jagata eva ( Anuktāvapi prastutatvāt ) tadanyatadvirodhi tatra dṛśyāmānadōṣavarjitaśca akārārtham iti siddhyati.*

The (A) conveying a negation signifies the absence of something previously referred to or contextually given or something else opposed to it in nature. Hence, as the world of matter and souls is contextually given, the syllable अ refers to a Being which is other than them, of a contrary nature, and without their flaws and limitations-

तस्मात् पारानन्ध्याल्पगुणत्वादिसर्ववस्तुस्वभावविरुद्धस्वभावं, स्वतन्त्रं, पूर्णगुणं सर्वजीवजडेभ्योऽन्यत् अज्ञानदुःखाल्पत्वपारतन्त्र्य उत्पत्तिनाशादिसर्वदोषविवर्जितं ब्रह्मैव अकारार्थः ।

*Tasmāt pāratantryālpaguṇatvādisarvavastusvabhāva-viruddhasvabhāvam swatantram pūrṇaguṇam sarvajīvajade-bhyō nyat ajñānaduḥkhālpatvapāratantrya utpattināśādi-sarvadōṣavarjitam brahmaiva akārārthaḥ.*

Therefore the meaning of the syllable is only Brahman whose nature is contrary to all that is dependent or



endowed with limited attributes, and is in contrast to them all independent -- is infinite in its auspicious attributes and absolutely different from all *Jivās* and *Jaḍās* and utterly devoid of the flaws of ignorance, sorrow, insignificance, dependence, origination and destruction or diminution.

It will thus be seen that the true subject matter of the *Upaniṣads* is not the *Pratyagātman* or the individual self of man—but the Supreme Lord who is the inner Ruler and indwelling principle in all our selves. The world of matter in which we live and which is our field of action is a real creation of the Lord for the benefit of His creatures. It is neither a physical transformation of the Lord – nor an appearance foisted by beginningless ignorance on pure consciousness of Atman. It is educed by the Lord's own active will power, sustained and protected by His unthinkable wondrous power, *Acintyādbhutaśakti*.



## LECTURE-V

### THE ONLY BONDAGE OF SOULS ACCEPTABLE and GENUINE THEISM

There is no denying it that our souls are endowed with *Caitanya Śakti*. By all accounts *Caitanya Śakti* is superior by comparison to *Jadaśakti*. Therefore the souls as *Caitanyās*, now in bondage, could not have courted their own bondage and transmigration. As Shankara himself has pointed out no sane person would build a prison for himself and voluntarily stay in it:

नहि कश्चिदपरतंत्रः स्वेच्छया बन्धनागारं कृत्वा तत्रानुप्रविशति ।

*Nahi kaścidaparatantraḥ svecchayā bandhanāgāraṁ*

*kṛtvā tatrānupraviśati.*

If *Jadaśakti* or the alluring power of *Prakṛti* should have nevertheless enveloped the *Caitanyaśakti* of jivas, it must have derived that power from some other source which is superior to itself and to *Caitanyaśakti* at the same time. Such a source can only be the Supreme Brahman.

The claims of *Kāla*, *Karma*, the three *guṇās* of *Prakṛti* and *Avīdyā* too are equally untenable as possible causes of obscuring the *Caitanya Śakti*, independently by their own power. Madhva therefore rejects them for the same reason.

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न च कर्मविमामलकालगुणप्रभृतीशमचित्तनुतद्धि यतः ।

*Na ca karmavimāmalakālaguṇaprabhṛtīśamacittanuta-*  
*nutaddhi yataḥ.*

Thus, after logical elimination of the claims of these other Tatvas to be regarded as the final cause of the soul's bondage, we have to come to the conclusion that God's will or *Īśvareccha*, *Saṅkalpa* or *abhidhyāna* will have to be recognised as the final and independent cause of Bondage, acting through the others like *Karma*, the *guṇās* of *Prakṛti* etc.

Madhva has given the name of: *Swabhāvājñānavāda* to this theory. It is to be distinguished from the Advaita theory of *Brahmājñānavāda* - as Ramanuja describes it:

स्वाज्ञानकल्पितजगत्परमेश्वरत्वजीवत्वभेदकलुषीकृतभूमभावः ।

आच्छाद्य विक्षिपति संस्फुरदात्मतत्त्वं प्रत्यक्चित्तिर्विजयते भुवनैकयोनिः ।

ब्रह्मैवाविद्यया संसरति मुच्यते च ॥

*Swājñānakalpito jagatparamēśvaratva-*  
*jīvatvabhedakaluṣīkṛtabhūmabhavaḥ*  
*Ācchādya vikshipati saṁsphuradātmatatvam*  
*pratyakcītirvijayate bhuvanaikayoniḥ.*  
*Brahmaivāvidyayā saṁsarati mucyate ca.*

As *Advaitavāda* believes in the existence of only one Atman as the sole reality (identical with what the Upani-

śads call Brahman) the whole theory of Bondage in Advaita would, in the last analysis, involve the Supreme Brahman itself in bondage. For in the Advaita philosophy, Atman and Brahman are convertible terms. But the theory itself is illogical and opposed to the evidence of *Śrītis*. Objecting to *Brahmājñānavāda*, Ramanuja says in his *Śrībhāṣya* that it is opposed to the teaching of the *śrītis* which say it is the *jīvātman* who is subjected to bondage - and not the Brahman. Quoting from *Māṇḍūkya* and *Śvetāśvatara śrītis* Ramanuja writes:

जीवस्यैव हि मायया निरोधः श्रूयते ।

तमिश्रान्यो मायया सलितः इति ।

अनादिमायया सुप्तः यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । इति च ॥

*Jīvasyaiva hi māyayā nirodhaḥ śrūyate.*

*Tamīśrānyo māyayā saliptaḥ iti.*

*Anādimāyayā suptaḥ yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate iti ca.*

If the pure intelligence of Brahman could be obscured by *Ajñāna* which is itself to be liquidated by knowledge of Brahman, who is there to save Brahman from such an obscuration of its own nature:

ज्ञानरूपं परं ब्रह्म तन्निवर्त्यं मृषात्मकम् ।

अज्ञानं चेत् तिरस्कुर्यात् कः प्रभुः तन्निवर्तने ॥

*Jñānarūpaṁ param brahma tannivartyaṁ mṛṣātmakam*

*Ajñānam cet tiraskuryāt kaḥ prabhuḥ tannivartane.*



or, is there in reality no such obscuration at all? If that be so, where is the question of bondage or taking steps to get rid of it? If bondage is due to (*ārōpa*) superimposition of the characterisation of Anantman on the Atman - it is not a reality. The prolonged efforts of intensive *sāadhanās* to take off the superimposition, carried over one or more lives, as the case may be

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते ।

*Bahūnām janmanāmante jñānavān mām prapadyate.*  
would be like chasing a shadow—

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न बन्धो न च साधनः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्तः इत्येषा परमार्थता ।

*Na nirodho na cōtpattiḥ na bandho na ca sādhanah*  
*Na mumukshurna vai muktaḥ ityeṣā paramārthatā.*

The atman is conceived in advaita as *Nirviśeṣa cinmātram* - bare consciousness without any shades or aspects in its being, and it is also impartable and self luminous. Such a being cannot be veiled by *Ajñāna*, either in its entirety or in respect of a part of its being. If *Ajñāna* veils it entirely there will be no atman left to shine forth by itself. Being partless, we cannot think of *Ajñāna* invading a part of its being.

Bondage must therefore be real and the sufferer must be the *Jivātman*. Real bondage needs real *sādhana*s to get rid of it - There is indisputable truth in what Madhva says:

अतो यथार्थबन्धस्य विना विष्णुप्रसादतः ।

अनिवृत्तिस्तदर्थं हि जिज्ञासात्र विधीयते ॥

*Ato yathārthabandhasya vinā viṣṇuprasādataḥ  
Anivṛttistadartham hi Jijñāsātra vidhīyate.*

*Jivājñānavāda* is thus the only viable theory of bondage which genuine theism can admit and approve of. Madhva has given it the name of: *Svabhāvājñānavāda*. This does not mean that *Ajñāna* forms part of the Jiva's essential nature, *Svabhāva* or *Svarūpa*, in which case it can never be destroyed. It is only an external veil (*āvaraṇam*) which can be pasted by Divine grace and initiative. Though Madhva has not himself elaborated the full significance of the term: *Swabhāvājñānavāda* his commentator Jayatirtha has given several weighty explanations of the phrase, all of them emphasising the point that this bondage is real and has come about by God's will to serve a teleological purpose in cosmic dispensation.

1) स्वस्य भावो धर्मः पारतन्त्र्यादिः तद्विषयकमज्ञानं जीवस्य इति

वादः स्वभावाज्ञानवादः ।



*Svasya bhāvō dharmah pāratantryādīh tadviṣayakamajñānam jīvasya iti vādaḥ svabhāvājñānavādaḥ.*

Taking 'Sva' in the sense of the *Jīva*, his natural attributes like dependence on the Lord, limited knowledge, limited bliss and power etc., are called: *swabhāva's*. The ignorance of the *Jīva* in the state of *Samsāra* in respect of these attributes of his and assumption of independence of initiative *svātantryābhimāna* and so on is therefore termed; *svabhāvājñāna* which ails him:

## 2) स्वयमेव भवति अस्तीति स्वभावाः (वास्तवः)

नाज्ञानकल्पित इति यावत् ।

*Svayameva bhavati astīti swabhāvaḥ (vāstavaḥ)*

*Nājñānakalpita iti yāvat.*

which means this *Ajñāna* has an actual reality and existence, and is not fancied by ignorance.

## 3) स्वश्चासौ भावश्चेति स्वभावो जीवः ।

तदाश्रितं तदावरणं चाज्ञानमिति वादः ।

*Swaścāsau bhāvaśceti swabhāvo jīvaḥ.*

*tadāśritam tadāvaraṇam cājñānamiti vādaḥ.*

'Sva-bhāva' signifies one's being - i. e., the self. Ignorance which resides on it and veils it is *Svabhāvājñāna*.

## 4) स्वभावभूतमेवाज्ञानं न मिथ्या इति वादः ।

*Swabhāvabhūtam eva jñānam na mithyā iti vādaḥ.*

*Ajñāna* has a factual existence. It is not unreal. Such a view may also be designated as *Svabhāvājñānavāda*.

### 5) स्वभावेन स्वतन्त्रेण परमेश्वरेण जीवस्वाज्ञानम् ।

*Svabhāvena Svatantrēṇa paramēśvareṇa jīvasyājñānam.*

*Svabhāva* means that which has independence of being as its own right. Such a being is the Lord alone. Ignorance induced by the mysterious powers of such a lord is: *Swabhāvājñānavāda*. The *Jivasvarūpa* as *Caitanya* must necessarily be *Svaprakāśa* or self luminous - capable of intuiting its own being and other essential attributes of bliss etc. How then can a being which is *Svayamprakāśa*, become affected or obscured by ignorance? The same questions directed against the Advaita-Atman or Brahman, such as whether ignorance conceals the entire being of Atman or Brahman or only a part of it - and the difficulties connected with either alternative may be raised in regard to the *Svaprakāśa Jiva Caitanya* also in Madhva's philosophy (*Yatra Ubhayorhi Samo doṣaḥ*). But the alleviating point in regard to the *Jīvātman* in Madhva's philosophy is that it is conceived as a *Saviśeṣa*-and finite entity, controlled by the Lord. Though an integral whole, the *Jivasvarūpa* has many *viśeṣas* in its build - up. It is possible for a *Saviśeṣa* entity to be fully conscious of some of its integral aspects and at the same time be oblivious of some others - by the supervening power (*ācchāḍaka śakti*) of the lord -



on account of its finitude. A finite being like the *jīva* who is dependent on the lord can be exposed to partial ignorance of his own nature and attributes – by the superior powers of the Lord. But the Lord Himself cannot be put in the same predicament as the *jīva*. what is sauce for the goose is not the same, in this case, for the gander.

तस्य स्वप्रकाशस्यापि जीवस्य परमेश्वरेच्छया परमेश्वरे स्वधर्मेषु  
च अज्ञानं संभवत्येव । अज्ञानमपि सत्यमेव नाज्ञानकल्पितम् ।

धूमेनाव्रियते वह्निः यथादर्शो मलेन च ।

यथोल्लेखेनावृतो गर्भः तथा तेनेदमावृतम् ॥

*Tasya svaprakāśasyāpi jīvasya paramaśvarecchayā  
paramaśvare svadharmeṣu ca ajñānam sambhavatyeva  
Ajñānamapi satyameva nājñānakalpitam.*

*Dhūmenāvriyate vahniḥ yathādarśo malena ca  
yatholbenāvṛto Garbhaḥ tathā tenedamāvṛtam.*

The Theory of *Svabhāvājñānavāda* recognises two layers of obscuration in the Jivatman. One is *Jivāccādika* and the other is *paramācchādika*. The former obscures part of the *Jivasvarūpa* allowing only a tiny flash of bare existence and consciousness to peep out and be intuited in the embodied life. The other aspects like *Svarūpānanda*, lie obscured. The other obscuring factor of *Bhāvarūpājñāna* is the *Paramācchādikā* which screens off the Lord and His grand attributes from the *Jīva*'s vision. When God's grace descends

on the Seeker, it rends both these veils and reveals both the *Jīvasvarūpa* and the Lord's majesty to the Jīva.

अजे द्वे प्रकृती दुष्टे नृषु प्रातिस्विके स्थिते ।

स्वगुणाच्छादिकात्वेका परमाच्छादिकाऽपरा ।

*Aje dve prakṛtī duṣṭe nṛṣu prāṭisvike sthite  
svagunācchādikāṭvekā paramācchādikāpara.*

This is beautifully conveyed by one of the Upanisads.

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः । तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् ।

*Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ*

*Tasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanūm svām.*

Here, by 'Dēhali dīpa nyāya' the reflexive pronoun *Svām* (*tanūm*) refers to the revelation by God of His own true nature to the Jīva as well as the Jīva's own true nature of *Bimbapratibimbabhāva* relation to the fortunate self. This clearly shows that ultimately it is the Lord who redeems the Soul by His own grace and reveals Himself to the devotee. No other power is competent to do so. We have seen that for obvious reasons no other principle can have the power to eclipse the soul's self luminosity and subject it to transmigration. That is why the *Sṛtis* and *smṛtis* tell us:

बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः ।

कैवल्यदः परंब्रह्म विष्णुरेव सनातनः ।

सर्वरूपोऽक्षयितिममहेतुः (svet. up.)



*Bandhako bhavapāśena bhavapāśācca mocakaḥ  
Kaivalyadaḥ param brahma viṣṇureva sanātanaḥ  
Samsāramokshasthitibandhahetuḥ (svet. Up.)*

And that is why Sri Madhva himself declares:

परमात्मापरोक्ष्यं तत्प्रसादादेव न जीवशक्त्या

(B.S.B.III.2.23)

*Paramātmāparokshyam tatprasādādeva na*

*jīvaśaktyā (B.S.B.III. 2.23)*

The crucial fact about the bondage of Souls to be noted is that it cannot be traced solely to total ignorance *Anādyavidyā*. In the last analysis, Avidya too can only be an instrument of bondage (*Nimittamātram*) and not the sole and independent cause of bondage. This point has been very cogently established by Jayatirtha in his *Nyāyasudhā*:

नचाज्ञानमात्र निबन्धनोऽयं बन्धो जीवस्य । श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहास-  
पुराणादिषु परमेश्वरेच्छा निमित्तकत्वावगमात् । ज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपो हि  
जीवः तद्भावानुपलब्धिश्च अनुभवसिद्धा । तेनावगम्यते-अस्ति किमप्या-  
वरकं येनावृतः स्वप्रकाशचैतन्यस्वरूपोपि नात्मनः तत्त्वं वेद । न च  
कामकर्मादिकमेव तथाभवितुमर्हति । तस्यापि सादिनः कारणापेक्षत्वात्  
न च पूर्वेणैवासादुजोत्तरोत्पत्तिः इति युक्तम् । सुप्तिप्रलययोस्तद्वृत्त्यभावेन

निष्कलंकचैतन्यबलात् स्वरूपावभासप्रसक्तेः । अतः कामकर्माद्यतिरिक्ता  
मायाविद्याप्रकृत्यादिशब्दाभिधेयं अनाद्येव किमपि द्रव्यं (आवरकम्)  
अङ्गीकार्यम् । न च मायापि कथं स्वप्रकाशमावृणोतीति युक्तम् ।  
अवरकतयैव तस्याः प्रसिद्धत्वात् वक्ष्यते चात्रोपपत्तिः । न च जडस्य  
स्वतः किञ्चिदावरकत्वं युक्तम् । अतः परमेश्वर एव स्वाधीनया प्रकृत्या  
सत्त्वादिगुणमय्या विद्याविरोधित्वेनाविद्यया अचिन्त्याद्भुतया स्वशक्त्या  
च जीवस्य स्वप्रकाशमपि स्वरूपचैतन्यमाच्छादयतीति युक्तम् ।

*Na cājñānamātranibandhanoyam bandho jīvasya. Sṛti-  
smṛtītihāsapurāṇādiṣu parameśvarecchānimittakatvāvagamāt  
Jñānānandasvarūpo hi jīvaḥ tadbhāvānupalabdhiśca anubhava-  
siddhā. Tenāvagamya - Asti kimapyāvarakam yenāvṛtaḥ  
svaprakāśacaitanya svarūpopi nātmanaḥ tatvam veda. Na ca  
kāmakarmādikameva tathābhavitumarhati. Tasyāpi sādinaḥ  
kāraṇāpekshatvāt na ca pūrvapūrvasmāduddatarotpattiḥ iti  
yuktam. Suptipralayayo tadvṛtyabhāvena niṣkalaṅkacaita-  
nyabalāt svarūpābhāsaprasakteḥ. Ataḥ kāmakarmādyatiri-  
ktam māyāvīdyāprakṛtyādiśabdābhidheyam anādyeva kimapi  
dravyam (āvarakam) aṅgikāryam. Na ca māyāpi katham  
svaprakāśamāvṛnotīti yuktam. Āvarakatayaiva tasyāḥ  
prasiddhatvāt vakshyate cātropapattiḥ. Na ca jaḍasya svataḥ  
kiñcidāvarakatvam yuktam. Ataḥ parameśvara eva svādhī-  
nayā prakṛtyā satvādiguṇamayyā vidyāvirodhitvenāvidyayā  
acintyādbhūtayā, svaśaktyā, ca jīvasya svaprakāśamapi  
svarūpacaitanyamācchādayatīti yuktam.*



The pristine nature of the self is one of pure bliss, knowledge etc. Its full expression however lies obscured and not experienced in *Samsāra*. It lies dormant like biological potency in childhood. This has been elaborated in the *Brahmasutra-Pumstvādivat*. It is therefore undisputable that it is not fully and completely realised in the state of bondage. This shows there is some obscuring element which prevents the self-shining spirit from realising its full measure of knowledge and bliss here and now.

But this obscuring element cannot be *Kāma*, *Karma* or other factor, for they all have a beginning and need an earlier source to account for them.

We cannot think of a series of their chain—each prior link being the cause of the succeeding one. For in the state of *Suṣupti* and *Pralaya*, there is a break or suspension (suspension period – no salary) of the operation of *Karma*, *Kāma*, etc. It should therefore be possible for the Jiva to realise the full measure of his intelligence and bliss in those states untrammelled by the obstacles of *Karma*, *Kāma* etc. But the evidence of *Sṛtis* and experience shows that there is total forgetfulness all round in those states:

अस्वाप्सं नाहं किंचनावेदिषम् ।

नात्मानं न पराश्रयं न सत्यं नापि चानृतम् ।

*Asvāpsam nāham kiñca nāvedīṣam*

*Nātmānam nā parāṅścaiva na satyam nāpi cāṅṛtam.*

*Prāññaḥ kiñcana samvetti.....* [Maṇḍūkya]

It must therefore be clear to the meanest intelligence that there is some veiling substance, other than *Kāma*, *Karma* and others-which has been referred to in the scriptures by such names as *Māyā*, *Avidyā* and *Prakṛti*. As it is in the nature of *Māyā* to act as a veil, there is no point in questioning how *Māyā* can obscure the caitanya. However as this *Māyā* or *Avidya*, also known as *Bhāvarūpajñāna*, is an equally insentient principle (*Jaḍa*), it cannot be taken to be able to conceal the *Caitanya* by its own power.

Having come to this end of the logical tether, we have to go beyond *Bhāvākhyājñāna* and explain the fact of bondage intelligibly. We have therefore to admit that in the last analysis it is the Supreme Being Himself who obscures the Jiva's self luminous nature to some extent by His will, by interposing the *Prakṛti* which is made up of the three *gunas* of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tāmas*. This *Prakṛti* itself is designated as *Avidya* in so far as it is opposed to *Vidyā* and is entirely dependent on the Lord Himself, with His own mysterious and wondrous power, *acintyādbhuta śakti*, which is capable of accomplishing the seemingly unaccomplishable by ordinary means - keeps the souls nature partially obscured.



After exposing the Jiva to such ignorance of his own true nature and the Lord's own majesty and relationship to Him, the Lord brings the Jiva into contact with the evolutes of *Prakṛti* which have developed their potentialities at the impulsion of the lord Himself and provides him with suitable physical bodies and organs and imbues him with a sense of ownership over them and with a sense of independence of his own initiative and activity in the enjoyment of their fruits. The Jiva's involvement thereafter in the vortex of life exposes him to the joys and sorrows, pleasures and pains, success and failures and the bonds get tightened after life. In consequence, the Jiva comes to arrogate to himself independence of initiative and ownership over his god-given gifts of body senses, kith and kin, and worldly assets and becomes a slave to their pulls. This is the essence of *Avidya* and bondage. The *Avidyā* itself and its nexus with him are real enough. So too his body and organs and his sorrows and joys though as a matter of fact they are all dependent on the Lord. They are mistaken by the *Jiva* to be his own independent possessions. So intimate is his interpretative association with them that he is unable to see himself apart from them – as one is unable to perceive the coal apart from the blaze of it— *Āṅgāravahnivat*.

As the attractions develop, he is torn by likes and dislikes and makes a vain bid to get clear of them.

The remedies he tries to get out of the vicious circle prove ineffective and he forges new links of births and deaths and rushes from pillar to post, and finds no peace or solace. So goes the troubled life of selves until they seek the Lord's help to deliver them from the nightmare of life.

नानेके परदेशि नानेके बडवनो .... (kannada)

ततो रागद्वेषाभ्यां प्रयुक्तः तन्निवृत्तये यत्करोति तदप्येतादृगेवा-  
तनोतीत्यनेकयोनिषु बभ्रमीति न काप्यात्यन्तिकं तदुपशमनं लभते विना  
परमपुरुषाराधनात् इति ।

*Nāneke paradeśi nāneke baḍavano* [kannada]

*Tato rāgadvēṣābhyām prayuktaḥ tannivṛttaye yatka-  
roti tadapyetadr̥gevātanotītyanekayonīṣu babhramīti na kvā-  
pyātyantikam tadupaśamanam labhate vinā paramapuruṣā-  
rāadhanāt iti.*

Sri Madhva therefore concludes that as the theory of the unreality of bondage as due to a superimposition of beginningless ignorance is logically untenable, we have to opt for a realistic theory of bondage— which is free from the difficulties which beset the monistic theory of:

अनादिमिथ्याज्ञानकृतो मिथ्या बन्धः

Therefore *Svabhāvajñānavāda* of Jīva is the only viable theory of Bondage acceptable to a Theistic philosophy.







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| 1    | 6                     | Dviata                                                                                                                 | Dvaita                   |
| 4    | 13                    | yamayate                                                                                                               | yamayati                 |
| 9    | 7                     | gave                                                                                                                   | give                     |
| 10   | 12                    | location                                                                                                               | creation                 |
| 16   | 1                     | periodically                                                                                                           | Commonly                 |
| 26   | 14                    | but entitled                                                                                                           | not entitled             |
| 37   | 13                    | tne                                                                                                                    | the                      |
| 39   | 9                     | admlt                                                                                                                  | admit                    |
| 41   | 7                     | Self of Supporting                                                                                                     | Self-Supporting          |
| 43   | 1                     | thats ubstance                                                                                                         | that substance           |
| 43   | 23                    | distisict                                                                                                              | distinct                 |
| 44   | 11                    | nreality                                                                                                               | unreality                |
| 53   | 16                    | las                                                                                                                    | last                     |
| 63   | 13                    | ज्ञानवद्वयपदेशो                                                                                                        | ज्ञातवद्वयपदेशो          |
| 65   | 11                    | Shankara                                                                                                               | Śankara                  |
| 74   | 24                    | Brahman's                                                                                                              | (delete)                 |
| 76   | 17                    | सत्ताप्रदाता                                                                                                           | सत्ताप्रधानपुरुषशक्तीनां |
| 78   | 19                    | आकारो                                                                                                                  | अकारो                    |
| 81   | 2-3 (Lecture V Title) | <i>SVABHĀVĀJÑĀNAVĀDA</i><br>The Only Viable Theory of<br>Bondage Of Souls Acceptable<br>To Genuine Theism.<br>Shankara |                          |











## ನಮ್ಮ ಮುಂದಿನ ಪ್ರಕಟಣೆಗಳು

- 1 ಶ್ರೀಮಧ್ವಾಚಾರ್ಯರ ಜೀವನ ಚರಿತ್ರೆ ಮತ್ತು ಉಪದೇಶಗಳು [ಇಂಗ್ಲಿಷ್ ಮೂಲ- ಶ್ರೀ ಸಿ. ಎಂ. ಪದ್ಮನಾಭಾಚಾರ್ಯ, ಅನುವಾದ: ಶ್ರೀ ವಿ. ಬಾದರಾಯಣಮೂರ್ತಿ]
- 2 ಭಾರತೀಯ ತತ್ವಶಾಸ್ತ್ರದ ಚರಿತ್ರೆ [ಇಂಗ್ಲಿಷ್ ಮೂಲ- ಡಾ|| ಎಸ್. ಎನ್. ದಾಸಗುಪ್ತ, ಅನುವಾದ: ಪ್ರೊ. ಆರ್. ಜಿ. ಕುಲಕರ್ಣಿ]
- 3 ಶ್ರೀ ಮಧ್ವಾಚಾರ್ಯರ ತತ್ವವಾದದ ರೂಪರೇಖೆಗಳು [ಶ್ರೀ ಬಿ. ಎ. ಕೃಷ್ಣಸ್ವಾಮಿ ರಾವ್ (ಪ್ರಿನ್ಸಿಪಾಲ್) ಅನುವಾದ: ಡಾ. ವಿಮಲ]
- 4 ಬ್ರಹ್ಮಸೂತ್ರಭಾಷ್ಯ [ಇಂಗ್ಲಿಷ್ ಮೂಲ ಶ್ರೀ ಎಸ್. ಸುಬ್ಬರಾವ್, ಅನುವಾದ: ಪ್ರಿನ್ಸಿಪಾಲ್ ಶ್ರೀ ಆರ್. ಜಿ. ಕುಲಕರ್ಣಿ]
- 5 ಗೀತಾಭಾಷ್ಯ [ಇಂಗ್ಲಿಷ್ ಮೂಲ-ಶ್ರೀ ಎಸ್. ಸುಬ್ಬರಾವ್, ಅನುವಾದ: ಶ್ರೀ ವಿ. ಬಾದರಾಯಣಮೂರ್ತಿ]
- 6 ರೈನ್ ಆಫ್ ರಿಯಲಿಸಮ್ [ಮೂಲ-ಡಾ|| ಆರ್. ನಾಗರಾಜಶರ್ಮ, ಅನುವಾದ: ಭಾಗ-೧ ಶ್ರೀ ಕೌಲಗಿ ರಾಮಾಚಾರ್ಯ, ಭಾಗ-೨ ಶ್ರೀ ವಿ. ಬಾದರಾಯಣಮೂರ್ತಿ]
- 7 ಶ್ರೀ ಮಧ್ವಾಚಾರ್ಯರು ಮತ್ತು ಬ್ರಹ್ಮತರ್ಕ [ಮೂಲ-ಶ್ರೀ ಸಿ. ಆರ್. ಕೃಷ್ಣರಾವ್ ಅನುವಾದ: ಕೌಲಗಿ ರಾಮಾಚಾರ್ಯ]
- 8 Brahma Sutra Bhashya by S. Subba Rao
- 9 Geetha Bhashya by S. Subba Rao
- 10 Brihadaranyaka Upanishad as expounded by Sri Madhvacharya by Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, M. A. Ph. D. D. Litt.
- 11 Bhagavadgita and its Classical Commentaries by Dr. S. K. Bhavani
- 12 Dr. C. N. R. Rao Memorial Lectures 85-86  
Prof. K. T. Pandurangi
- 13 Madhya and Brahma Tantras by C. R. Krishna Rao